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Abstract
We investigate the eﬃciency of a market institution (an auction) relative to a non-
market institution (a quota) as a water allocation mechanism in the presence of frictions,
by exploring a particular historical institutional change in Mula, Spain. We estimate
a structural dynamic model under the auction accounting for the three main features
in the empirical setting: intertemporal substitution, liquidity constraints, and season-
ality. We use the estimated model to compute the welfare under auctions, quotas, and
the highest-valuation allocation. We find that the institutional change in Mula, from
auctions to quotas, was welfare improving for the apricot farmers considered.
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1 Introduction
Water allocation is a central concern of policy discussions around the world. Water scarcity
is extremely acute in places such as India, Latin America, and the U.S. (Vörösmarty et
al., 2010). Seventy percent of fresh water usage worldwide is for irrigation. Water markets
are emerging as the preferred institution to allocate irrigation water used by farmers in the
developed world, particularly in dry regions of the U.S. and Australia (Grafton et al., 2011).
In the absence of frictions, water markets are eﬃcient because they allocate water according
to farmers’ valuations. When frictions are present, however, markets may not be eﬃcient.
Consider, for example, the friction that arises when some farmers do not have enough cash to
pay for water in the market (i.e. some farmers are liquidity constrained). A market allocates
water to the farmer who has the highest valuation, and is not liquidity constrained. A market
failure occurs if some of the farmers who are liquidity constrained have higher valuations
than farmers who are not liquidity constrained. In this case, a non-market institution may
allocate water more eﬃciently than a market.
In this paper, we investigate the eﬃciency of a market institution (an auction) relative
to a non-market institution (a quota as described below) as a water allocation mechanism in
the presence of frictions. To perform the empirical analysis, we use data from water markets
in Mula, Spain. Frictions arose in Mula because some farmers did not have enough cash
during the summer to purchase water in the market. The market price of water increased
substantially during summer because: (i) the agricultural products cultivated in the region,
such as apricots, needed more water during this season of rapid fruit growth, thus increasing
demand for water; and (ii) weather seasonalities in southern Spain generated low rainfall
during the summer. These conditions made summer the dry or “critical” season.
In the leading article of the first volume of the American Economic Review, Coman (1911)
pointed out this issue about liquidity constraints during the critical season: “In southern
Spain, where this system obtains and water is sold at auction, the water rates mount in a
dry season to an all but prohibitive point.” During the critical season, only wealthy farmers
1
could aﬀord to buy water.1 But poor farmers with the same production technology (i.e.
who grew the same agricultural products) would also benefit from buying water during the
critical season. Indeed, we find that poor farmers bought less water during the critical season
than wealthy farmers who had the same crop and number of trees.
To perform the eﬃciency analysis we exploit four unique features of our data. First, for
over 700 years from 1244 until 1966, the citizens of Mula used an unregulated market (an
auction as described in Donna and Espín-Sánchez, 2018) to allocate water from the river
among farmers. This is an unusual scenario because when water markets are used, they are
typically regulated markets (Grafton et al., 2011; Libecap, 2011). Changes in regulatory
frameworks over time or across geographical markets preclude to infer gains from trade
using price diﬀerences. Recovering demand in such cases requires strong assumptions about
market participants (Libecap, 2011). Second, water in this setting is an intermediate good
used to produce crops, the final products. Water demand is determined by the technological
constraint imposed by the crop’s production function, which in turn determines the seasonal
water need of the tree, as we explain below. Thus, the demand for water is independent of
the wealth of the farmer, as long as the farmer has enough cash to pay for the water (i.e.
there are no income eﬀects). We focus on the set of farmers who only grow apricot trees
and, thus, have the same production function. Third, some of the farmers in Mula were
part of the wealthy elite. We identify the wealthy farmers by merging urban real estate tax
records with auction data.2 We use that the wealthy farmers were not liquidity constrained
as argued in Section 2, and the previous feature—that water is an intermediate good—to
estimate the transformation rate of the production function that characterizes the demand
system for all apricot farmers. This approach allows us to use the empirical context of
Mula to diﬀerentiate liquidity constraints from unobserved heterogeneity, as we discuss in
1In our analysis we define a farmer as “wealthy” if the value of urban real estate of the farmer obtained
from the urban real estate tax data is above the median among the apricot farmers, and “poor” otherwise.
2In Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2017) we use a diﬀerent criterion to identify wealthy farmers,
whether a farmer uses the honorific title Don. We show that the behavior of poor and wealthy
farmers thus defined is also consistent with the presence of liquidity constraints.
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Section 7. Finally, in 1966 the market in Mula was replaced by a non-market institution, a
quota.3 Under the quota system, farmers who owned a plot of fertile land were entitled to a
fixed amount of water—proportional to the size of their plot—for irrigation, and paid only a
small annual fee for maintenance costs. A natural question arises: How did the institutional
change from auctions to quotas aﬀect welfare in the presence of liquidity constraints?
In this paper, we empirically investigate how this institutional change—from auctions
to quotas—aﬀected eﬃciency as a measure of welfare. With output data before and after
the institutional change, computing welfare would be straightforward. However, output
data is not available. We build a structural econometric model that allows us to compute
the output under auctions and quotas. The econometric model uses detailed input data
(units of water purchased, rainfall amount, number of apricot trees, etc.) along with the
apricot’s production function, that transforms these inputs into apricots, to compute the
counterfactual output before and after the institutional change. In the model, water for
irrigation has diminishing returns, and farmers are heterogeneous on two dimensions: their
willingness to pay (productivity) and their ability to pay for the water (cash holdings). On
the one hand, in the absence of liquidity constraints, markets are eﬃcient. On the other hand,
in the absence of heterogeneity in productivity, a fixed quota system is eﬃcient, due to the
decreasing marginal returns of water.4 In our empirical setting, although farmers are ex-ante
homogeneous in productivity, they are ex-post heterogeneous in productivity because they
receive an i.i.d. productivity shock in each period. In addition, some farmers are liquidity
constrained. In this general case, the eﬃciency of auctions relative to quotas is ambiguous
as discussed in Section 6. It is then an empirical question to assess which institution is more
eﬃcient. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical study has investigated the eﬃciency of
auctions relative to quotas in the presence of liquidity constrained bidders.
3In this paper we do not exploit the institutional change from 1966 as a source of variation due to lack
of output data. See Espín-Sánchez (2017) for details about the historical institutional change.
4In a static setting, if farmers are suﬃciently wealthy, markets are eﬃcient. If farmers are homogeneous,
quotas are eﬃcient. If all farmers are homogeneous and suﬃciently wealthy, then both markets and quotas
are eﬃcient. In a dynamic setting the characterization of eﬃciency is more complex, and it includes the
probability distribution of the evolution of the supply of water and future irrigation.
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We begin our empirical analysis by estimating demand for water under the auction sys-
tem. To estimate demand, we account for three features of the empirical setting. First,
irrigation increases the moisture level of the land, thus reducing future demand for water.
Irrigation creates an intertemporal substitution eﬀect, where water today is an imperfect
substitute for water tomorrow because it evaporates over time. The resulting dynamics in
the irrigation demand system are similar to those in the storable goods demand system. Soil’s
moisture level in the former plays an analogous role to inventory in the latter (e.g. Hendel
and Nevo, 2006). Second, some farmers are liquidity constrained. Wealthy, unconstrained,
farmers strategically delay their purchases, and buy water during the critical season, when
agricultural products need water the most. Poor farmers, who may be liquidity constrained,
buy water before the critical season in anticipation of an increase in price. Finally, weather
seasonality increases water demand during the critical season, when fruit grows more rapidly.
Seasonality shifts the whole demand system, conditional on intertemporal substitution and
liquidity constraints.5
Ignoring the presence of liquidity constraints biases the estimated demand elasticity
downwards. To see this, consider the decrease in demand due to an increase in price during
the critical season. When farmers are liquidity constrained, the decrease in demand has two
components: (1) the decrease in demand due to the price being greater than the valuation
of certain farmers; and (2) the decrease in demand due to some farmers being liquidity con-
strained, even when their valuation is above the prevailing price. If one does not account for
the second component, one would attribute this decrease in demand to greater price sensi-
tivity. Thus, one would incorrectly interpret liquidity constraints as more elastic demand,
biasing the estimated demand downwards.
In our econometric model the farmer’s utility has three components. First, the apri-
5To account for the intertemporal substitution eﬀect, we condition water demand on the moisture level of
the soil. The moisture level is obtained by applying the findings from the literature in agricultural engineering
described in Appendix A.2, and the observed rainfall and irrigation. This procedure allows to construct a
moisture variable for each farmer, that is treated as an observable state variable for the estimation (Hendel
and Nevo, 2006). The moisture variable measures the amount of water accumulated in each farmer’s plot.
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cot’s production function that transforms water into apricots. Second, the cost of producing
apricots, measured as the amount spent on water plus an irrigation cost. Finally, an idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock that is farmer specific. Conditional on the soil’s moisture level, the
type of agricultural product (i.e. apricot), and the number of trees, farmers’ productivity
is assumed to be homogeneous up to the idiosyncratic shock. This gives us the exclusion
restriction to identify the other source of heterogeneity, liquidity constraints. To estimate
the econometric model we construct a conditional choice probability estimator (Hotz and
Miller, 1993) using only data on the wealthy farmers, where liquidity constraints are not
binding.
We use the estimated dynamic demand system to compute welfare under auctions and
quotas. We show that: (i) the type of quota closest to the one implemented in Mula increased
welfare relative to auctions; and (ii) the welfare under auctions is greater than under quotas
with random assignment. These results show the importance of the choice of the type of
quota system.
In summary, we make three main contributions: (1) we combine a unique data set, that
includes detailed financial information and individual characteristics, with a novel econo-
metric approach to estimate demand in the presence of storability, liquidity constraints, and
seasonality; (2) we investigate the eﬃciency of auctions relative to quotas in the presence
of liquidity-constrained bidders by exploring a particular historical institutional change; (3)
from an historical perspective, we conclude that the institutional change in Mula was wel-
fare improving for the apricot farmers analyzed in this paper because the quota system more
often allocated water units following farmers’ valuations than did the market.
Related Literature
Scholars studying the eﬃciency of irrigation communities in Spain have proposed two com-
peting hypotheses to explain the coexistence of auctions and quotas. On the one hand,
Maass and Anderson (1978) claimed that, absent operational costs, auctions are more ef-
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ficient than quotas. They argued that both systems nevertheless existed because the less
eﬃcient system (quotas) was simpler, and easier to maintain. Hence, once operational costs
are take into account, quotas were more eﬃcient than auctions in places with less water
scarcity. This hypothesis is supported by observations of auctions in places where water was
extremely scarce (Musso y Fontes, 1847; Pérez Picazo and Lemeunier, 1985). On the other
hand, Garrido (2011) and González Castaño and Llamas Ruiz (1991) argued that owners of
water rights had political power, and were concerned only with their revenues, regardless of
the overall eﬃciency of the system.
The theoretical literature on auctions with liquidity constraints is recent (e.g. Che and
Gale, 1998). Our model is closest to that of Che et al. (2013). The authors assume that
agents can consume at most one unit of a good with linear utility in their type. They conclude
that markets are always more eﬃcient than quotas, although some non-market mechanisms
can outperform markets when resale is allowed. In our model, we allow agents to consume
multiple units with a concave utility function, and we incorporate dynamics (intertemporal
substitution). In our setting, there is no strict ranking between markets and quotas, but
non-market mechanisms with resale can still outperform both markets and quotas.
Auctions with liquidity constraints can be seen as a particular case of asymmetric auc-
tions. Athey et al. (2011) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2013) conclude that preferential
auctions decrease eﬃciency if they reallocate from high-bid bidders to low-bid bidders. If
some bidders face liquidity constraints, however, giving preferential treatment to those bid-
ders could increase eﬃciency, similarly to Marion (2007). If bidders with liquidity constraints
have higher valuations than unconstrained bidders, this reallocation would increase eﬃciency.
Identifying valuations from liquidity constraints is necessary to estimate eﬃciency gains in
preferential auctions. Ignoring the presence of liquidity constraints in preferential auctions
could bias the estimated distribution of valuations downwards. Moreover, if firms face ca-
pacity constraints, as in Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), then small firms would be more
eﬃcient than large firms when the latter have high capacity contracted. Because small firms
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are also more likely to face liquidity constraints, the presence of capacity constraints would
further increase the bias against small firms. A normative implication is that the govern-
ment or auctioneer increases eﬃciency by treating small firms’ bids favorably. A positive
implication is that treating bids of small firms as unconstrained bids underestimates the
productivity of small firms.
Recent macroeconomic research points to the importance of financial constraints, and
the dynamics of wealth accumulation in the real economy (Moll, 2014). Imperfect capital
markets are important in developing countries (Banerjee and Moll, 2010). Rosenzweig and
Wolpin (1993) estimate a structural model of agricultural investments in the presence of
credit constraints. Udry (1994) studies how state-contingent loans are used in rural Nigeria
to insure against some portion of output’s variability. Laﬀont and Matoussi (1995) show how
insuﬃcient working capital aﬀects contract arrangements in rural Tunisia. Jayachandran
(2013) demonstrates that the presence of liquidity constraints among land owners in Uganda
renders upfront payment in cash more eﬀective than promised future payments. Bubb et al.
(2016) study rural India, where liquidity constraints in water markets reduce eﬃciency, as
in our case.
We are not aware of any empirical paper analyzing the eﬀect of liquidity constraints in
an auction setting. Pires and Salvo (2015) find that low income households buy smaller
sized storable products (detergent, toilet paper, etc.) than do high income households, even
though smaller sized products are more expensive per pound. They attribute this puzzling
result to low income households’ liquidity constraints.
We estimate a dynamic demand model with seasonality and storability. There is a vast
empirical industrial organization literature on dynamic demand (e.g. Boizot et al., 2001;
Pesendorfer, 2002; Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Gowrisankaran and Rysman, 2012).6 However,
none of this work examines how liquidity constraints aﬀects demand. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the first to propose and estimate a demand model with storability,
6See Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2013) for a recent survey.
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seasonality, and liquidity constraints. Timmins (2002) studies dynamic demand for water,
and is closest to our paper, although he estimates demand for urban consumption rather
than demand for irrigation. Moreover, while Timmins (2002) uses parameters from the
engineering literature to estimate the supply of water, we use parameters from the literature
in agricultural engineering to determine both the demand structure and soil’s moisture levels
(see Appendix A.2). To estimate the parameters that characterize demand we use only
data from the wealthy farmers (excluding data from the poor farmers who may be liquidity
constrained), and then project the inferred preferences from these “trusted choices” onto the
welfare of the poor farmers in the counterfactual analysis. This approach of using trusted
choices for the welfare analysis is similar to the ones by, e.g., Handel and Kolstad (2015) and
Ketcham et al. (2016), who use the choices or revealed preferences of informed consumers
to identify risk preferences or to proxy for concealed preferences of misinformed consumers,
respectively.7
2 Environment and Data
2.1 Environment
Southeastern Spain is the most arid region of Europe. The region is located to the east of a
mountain chain, the Prebaetic System. Rivers flowing down the Prebaetic System provide
the region with irrigation water. Most years are dryer than the average. There are only a
few days of rain, but they are of high intensity.8
Weekly prices of water in the auction are volatile. These prices depend on the season of
the year, and the amount of rainfall. Because rainfall is diﬃcult to predict, it is also diﬃcult
to predict the need for cash to buy water in the auction. Water demand is seasonal, peaking
7A related approach is to investigate separately at the choices of trusted experts in the industry as in,
e.g., Bronnenberg et al. (2015) and Johnson and Rehavi (2016).
8For example, 681 millimeters of water fell in Mula on one day, 10th October 1943, while the yearly
average in Mula is 326 mm. Summers are dry, and rainfall occurs most often during fall and spring.
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during the weeks when fruit grows most rapidly, before the harvest. Farmers sell their output
after the harvest, once per year. Only then do farmers collect cash (revenue) from growing
their agricultural products. Hence, the weeks when farmers need cash the most to pay for
water in the auctions, the weeks before the harvest, are the weeks furthest away from the
previous harvest, when they collected the revenue the last time. As a consequence, poor
farmers who do not have other sources of revenue may be liquidity constrained.
Given that demand is seasonal, farmers take into account the joint dynamics of water
demand and price of water, when making auction’s purchasing decisions. Water today is an
imperfect substitute for water tomorrow. Future water prices are diﬃcult to predict. Farmers
consider current prices of water, and form expectations about future prices of water. A
farmer who expects to be liquidity constrained during the critical season—when the demand
is highest—may decide to buy water several weeks before the critical season, when the price
of water is lower.
Farmers are “hand-to-mouth” consumers in that they have only enough money for their
basic necessities (González Castaño and Llamas Ruiz, 1991). A farmer who expects to be
liquidity constrained in the future would attempt to borrow money. However, poor farmers
in Mula did not have access to credit markets.9 Even if a credit market is in place, lenders
may not grant loans. In the presence of limited liability (i.e. the farmer is poor), and non-
enforceable contracts (i.e. poor institutions), endogenous borrowing constraints emerge (see
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 2004, for a model of endogenous liquidity constraints). Hence,
even if a credit market exists, non-enforceable contracts would prevent farmers from having
cash when they need it most.10
9Interviews with surviving farmers confirm that some farmers were liquidity constrained—they did not
have enough cash to buy their desired amount of water—yet they did not borrow money from others. See
Appendix D.2 for details.
10In contrast to the German credit cooperatives from Guinnane (2001), the farmers in southeastern Spain
were not able to create an eﬃcient credit market. Spanish farmers were poorer than German farmers, and the
weather shocks were aggregate (not idiosyncratic) shocks, and greater in magnitude. Hence, to reduce the
risk, Spanish farmers should have resorted to external financing. However, external financing had problems,
such as monitoring costs and information acquisition, that credit cooperatives did not have.
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2.2 Institutions
Auctions. Since the 13th century, Spanish farmers used a sequential outcry ascending
price (or English) auction to allocate water. The basic structure of the sequential English
auction remained unchanged from the 13th century until 1966, when the last auction was
run. The auctioneer sold each of the units sequentially, and independently of each other.
The auctioneer tracked the buyer’s name, and price for each unit of water sold. Farmers had
to pay in cash on the day of the auction.11
Water was sold by cuarta (quarter), a unit that denoted the right to use water flowing
through the main channel during three hours at a specific date and time. Property rights to
water, and land were independent. Some individuals, not necessarily farmers, were Water-
lords. Waterlords owned the right to use the water flowing through the channel. The farmers
who participated in auctions owned only land. Water was stored at the main dam, and a
system of channels delivered it to the farmer’s plot. Water flowed from the dam through the
channels at approximately 40 liters per second, so each unit of water sold at auction (i.e.
the right to use water from the canal for three hours) carried approximately 432,000 liters of
water. During our period of analysis, auctions were held once a week, every Friday. During
each session, 40 units were auctioned: four units for irrigation during the day (from 7:00 AM
to 7:00 PM), and four units for irrigation during the night (from 7:00 PM to 7:00 AM) on
each weekday (Monday to Friday). Our sample consists of all water auctions in Mula from
January 1955 until July 1966, when the last auction was run.
Quotas. On August 1, 1966 the water allocation system switched from an auction to a
fixed quota system. Under this system, water allocation for each farmer was tied to land
ownership. Each plot of land was assigned a fixed amount of water every three weeks, called
a tanda. The amount of time allocated to each farmer was proportional to the size of the
11Allowing the farmers to pay after the critical season would have helped to mitigate the problems created
by the liquidity constraints, and would have increased the revenue in the auction. However, it was written
in their bylaws that the payment had to be in cash. This suggests that the water owners were concerned
about repayment after the critical season due to non enforceable contracts (poor Spanish institutions).
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farmer’s plot. Every December, a lottery assigned a farmer’s order of irrigation within each
round. The order did not change during the entire year. At the end of the year, farmers paid
a fee to the Sindicato, proportional to the size of their plot. Farmers paid after the critical
season, and were not liquidity constrained.12 The fee covered the year’s operational costs,
which included guard salaries and maintenance of the dam. In the counterfactual analysis
we use this quota system, a non-market institution, as point of reference against which we
compare the welfare of markets.
2.3 Data
We examine a unique panel data set where each period represents one week, and each in-
dividual represents one farmer. The unit of observation is a farmer-week. We collected the
data from four sources. The first source is the weekly auction. For the period from January
1955 until the last auction, in July 1966, we observe the price paid, the number of units
bought, the date of the purchase, and the date of the irrigation. This data was obtained
from the municipal archive of Mula. The second source is rainfall measurements, obtained
from the Spanish National Meteorological Agency, AEMET. The third source is a cross sec-
tional agricultural census from 1955. The census data contains information regarding the
farmer’s plots, including type of agricultural product, number of trees, production, and sale’s
price. The final source is urban real estate tax records from 1955. We use this information
to identify liquidity constraints. See Appendix A.1 for details, and summary statistics.
Auction Data. Auction data encompass 602 weeks, and can be divided into three
categories based on bidding behavior and water availability: (i) normal periods (300 weeks),
when for each transaction the name of the winner, price paid, date and time of the irrigation
for each auction were registered; (ii) no-supply periods (295 weeks), when due to water
shortage in the river or damage to the dam or channel—usually because of intense rain—no
12The farmer was the owner of the water under the quota system, so the price that the farmer paid was
the average cost of operation, which was smaller that the average price paid per unit of water under the
auction system.
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auction was carried out; and (iii) no-demand periods (7 weeks), when some units were not
sold due to lack of demand because of recent rain, and the price dropped to zero. For the
empirical analysis we use data for the period 1955-66.
Rainfall Data. We link auction data to daily rainfall data for Mula, which we obtain
from the Agencia Estatal de Metereología, AEMET (the Spanish National Meteorological
Agency). In regions with Mediterranean climate, rainfall occurs mainly during spring and
fall. Peak water requirements for products cultivated in the region are reached in spring and
summer, between April and August. The coeﬃcient of variation of rainfall is 450 percent
(37.08/8.29⇥ 100), indicating that rainfall varies substantially.
Agricultural Census Data. We also link auction data to the data that we collected
from the 1954/55 agricultural census from Spain, which provides information on individual
characteristics of farmers’ land. The Spanish government conducted an agricultural census
in 1954/55 to enumerate all cultivated soil, crop production, and agricultural assets available
in the country. The census recorded the following individual characteristics about farmers’
land: type of land and location, area, number of trees, production, and the price at which
this production was sold in the year of the census. We match the name of the farmer on
each census card with the name of the winner of each auction.
Urban Real Estate Tax Data. Finally, we link the previous data to the urban real
estate tax registry in 1955. To identify the source of financial constraints, we need a variable
related to farmers’ wealth but unrelated to their demand for water. We use urban real estate
taxes to identify the wealthy farmers, as explained next.
2.4 Preliminary Analysis
In this subsection, we provide descriptive patterns from the data. Four main fruit tress grow
in the region: orange, lemon, peach, and apricot. Oranges are harvested in winter, when
water prices are low; thus farmers are unlikely to face liquidity constraints. The other three
types of fruit are harvested in the summer. We focus on apricots because they are the most
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common of these summer crops.
Wealthy Farmers. We define a farmer as “wealthy” if the value of urban real estate
of the farmer obtained from the urban real estate tax data is above the median among the
apricot farmers, and “poor” otherwise. Farmers grow their agricultural products in rural
areas, thus, urban real estate constitutes non-agricultural wealth. In the empirical analysis,
we use the set of wealthy farmers, and exploit that they were never liquidity constrained.
We make two observations. First, the value of urban real estate owned by the farmer should
not aﬀect the farmer’s production function (i.e. the farmer’s willingness to pay for water),
conditional on the type of agricultural product, the size of the plot, and the number of trees.
Hence, after accounting for these variables, the value of the urban real estate should not be
correlated with a farmer’s demand for water, which is determined by the production function
of the agricultural product, apricots in our case. We later use this as an “exclusion restriction”
to identify liquidity constrained farmers. Second, we argue that wealthy farmers in Mula
were never liquidity constrained, because of the value of their urban real estate properties.
These farmers were very wealthy, owning several urban properties. For instance, on average
wealthy farmers had an annual rental income of 5,702 pesetas derived from the urban real
state. Whereas their average annual water expenditure was 500 pesetas. In 1963, the year
with the highest water expenditures in the sample, their average annual water expenditure
was 1,619 pesetas. None of the poor farmers owned any urban property.
Water Demand and Apricot Trees. Table 1 displays the seasonal stages of the typical
apricot tree that is cultivated in Mula, the búlida apricot. These trees need water the most
during the late fruit growth (stages II and III), and the early post harvest (EPH).13 This
defines the critical irrigation season for these apricot trees. Stage III corresponds to the
period when the tree “transforms” water into fruit at the highest rate. The EPH period is
important because of the hydric stress the tree suﬀers during the harvest (see Appendix A.2
13The beginning of the post-harvest period coincides with week 24. In the model in Section 3we assume
that all the harvest takes place on week 24. In practice the harvest would take several weeks. The tree is
vulnerable during the early post-harvest weeks, and the moisture of the tree during those weeks would aﬀect
the harvest of the current year.
13
Table 1: Seasonal Stages for “Búlida” Apricot Trees.
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
DORM FLOW FRUIT GROWTH POST-HARVEST DORM
I II III EARLY LATE
Notes: Obtained from Pérez-Pastor et al. (2009). DORM refers to Dormancy. FLOW refers to Flowering.
for details).
Figure 1 shows the purchasing patterns of wealthy, and poor apricot’s farmers. The figure
displays the average liters per tree that each type of farmer purchased in the auction. The
shaded area corresponds to the critical season as defined above. The price of water increases
substantially during the critical season because (i) apricots, along with other products cul-
tivated in the region, require more irrigation during this season, increasing the demand for
water in the auction; and (ii) weather seasonalities in southern Spain generate less rainfall
during these months (see Appendix A.1 for details). Wealthy farmers—who are not liquidity
constrained—demand water as predicted by Table 1. Wealthy farmers strategically delay
their purchases, and buy water during the critical season, when the apricot trees need water
the most. Poor farmers—who may be liquidity constrained—display a bimodal purchasing
pattern for water inconsistent with Table 1. The first peak occurs before the critical season,
when water prices are relatively low. Poor farmers buy water before the critical season be-
cause they anticipate that they may not be able to aﬀord water during the critical season,
when prices are high. A fraction of this water will evaporate, but the rest remains as soil’s
moisture. The second peak occurs after the critical season, when water prices are again
relatively low. After the critical season, poor farmers’ plot have a low moisture level if they
were unable to buy suﬃcient water during the critical season. Thus, poor farmers buy water
after the critical season to prevent their trees from withering. This purchasing pattern for
the poor farmers—high purchases before and after the critical season, and low purchases
during the critical season—is explained by the model that we present in Section 3, which
includes seasonality, storability, and liquidity constrains.14
14Table 2, discussed next, shows that the diﬀerences in purchases between poor and wealthy farmers are
only significant during the critical season. Although our model has clear predictions for the diﬀerence in
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Figure 1: Seasonality and Purchasing Patterns of Wealthy and Poor Farmers.
Notes: The figure displays the average liters bought per farmer and per tree disaggregated by wealthy and
poor farmers using a least squares smoother. A farmer is defined as wealthy if the value of urban real estate
of the farmer is above the median. A farmer is defined as poor if the value of urban real estate of the farmer
is below the median. The shaded area corresponds to the critical season as defined in Table 1.
Table 2: Demand for Water per tree and Urban Real Estate.
# units bought per tree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wealthy 0.0131*** 0.0073 0.0066 0.0017 0.0058 -0.0002
(0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0047) (00.49) (0.0051)
(Wealthy) 0.0374*** 0.0315*** 0.0383*** 0.0326***
⇥ (Critical Season) (0.0091) (0.0094) (0.0093) (0.0094)
(Wealthy) 0.0039 0.0104
⇥ (Weeks 1-10) (0.0092) (0.0101)
Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 14,448 14,448 14,448 14,448 14,448 14,448
Notes: All regressions are OLS specifications. The sample is restricted to farmers who grow only apricots. The dependent
variable is the number of units bought per tree by each individual farmer during a given week. “Wealthy” is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the value of urban real estate of the farmer is above the median, and 0 otherwise. “Critical season” is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the observation belongs to a week during the critical season, and 0 otherwise. “Weeks 1-10” is a dummy
that equals 1 if the observation belongs to one of the first ten weeks of the year, and 0 otherwise. “Covariates” are the price
paid by farmers in the auction, the amount of rainfall during the week of the irrigation, and the farmer’s soil’s moisture level.
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 2 shows similar evidence to the one in Figure 1 using OLS regressions. As in Figure
1, in Table 2 we restrict attention to farmers who grow only apricot trees. We regress the
number of units bought per tree by each farmer in a given week on several covariates. The
variable “wealthy” is a variable that equals 1 if the value of the urban real estate owned by the
farmer is greater than the sample median, and 0 otherwise.15 This dummy variable identifies
farmers who are wealthy, thus not liquidity constrained. For farmers who are not liquidity
constrained, demand for water should not be correlated with wealth. Consider two farmers
who grow apricots, have the same number of trees, and are not liquidity constrained. Water
demand is determined by a tree’s water need according to the apricot production function
as predicted by Table 1. These two farmers should have the same demand for water up
to an idiosyncratic shock. Therefore, there should be no relationship between the demand
for water, and the monetary value of urban real estate for unconstrained farmers. Table 2
displays the regressions using the number of units bought per tree as the dependent variable
to account for the size of the farmer’s plot.16 Column 1 shows that wealthy farmers buy
more water overall. However, the coeﬃcient is not statistically diﬀerent from zero in column
2, when we include the covariates. This is consistent with wealthy and poor farmers buying
the same amount of water throughout the year. In columns 3 and 4 we include an interaction
between “wealthy” and “critical season.” The variable “critical season” is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the observation belongs to a week during the critical season, and 0 otherwise,
as defined in Table 1. The interaction term is positive, and statistically diﬀerent from zero
in all specifications. Wealthy farmers demand more water per tree during the critical season
purchasing during the critical season, the predictions outside the critical season are ambiguous and depend
on the severity of liquidity constraints. In particular, poor farmers buy less water than wealthy farmers
outside the critical season only when liquidity constraints are severe.
15This definition of “wealthy” farmers is conservative. Both in the historical narrative and in our estimates
of the probability of being liquidity constraints in Appendix C.6, we find that some of the farmers who are
potentially liquidity constrained, i.e., non wealthy farmers, are not liquidity constrained. This results in a
smaller sample of wealthy farmers to estimate the demand for water. However, because the our main goal
is to study the behavior of liquidity constrained farmers, we chose to be conservative in this definition. The
results are similar if we select the 40th or the 60th percentile, instead of the median.
16Wealthy farmers own larger plots, and farmers can only buy whole units of water. So there may be
economies of scale in water purchases only available to wealthy farmers.
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than poor farmers who have the same agricultural products (apricots). The eﬀect of liquidity
constraints on the demand for water is concentrated on the critical season, when the price
for water in the auction is high. For robustness, in columns 5 and 6 we also include the
interaction between “wealthy” and an indicator for purchases during the first 10 weeks of the
year. The coeﬃcient of this interaction is not statistically diﬀerent from zero, as expected.
Appendix C.6 presents additional evidence about the presence of liquidity constraints for
the poor farmers, using the estimates of the model in the next section.
3 The Econometric Model
In this section, we present the econometric model that we use to compute welfare under
auctions and quotas. Computing welfare would be straightforward with output data (i.e.
production data) before and after the institutional change, but such output data is not avail-
able. Therefore, we use detailed input data (units of water purchased, amount of rainfall,
number of apricot trees, etc.) along with the apricot production function to compute the
output under auctions and quotas. We proceed in three steps. First, we present the econo-
metric model, which uses the apricot production function and incorporates the three features
of our setting: storability, liquidity constraints, and seasonality. Second, we estimate the
model using the input data for the wealthy farmers. Finally, we use the estimated model to
compute the counterfactual output of apricot, as a measure of welfare, under auctions and
quotas for all farmers (i.e. before and after the institutional change).
Farmers used a sequential outcry ascending price (or English) auction to allocate water.
Every week during each session, 40 units were auctioned: four units for irrigation during the
day and four units for irrigation during the night on each weekday (Monday to Friday). In
this paper we do not model the auction game and, thus, we abstract from the within-week
variation in prices, which is very low (see Donna and Espín-Sánchez 2018). We translate
the auction mechanism into a simpler dynamic demand system, whereby individual farmers
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take prices as exogenous. This allows us to focus on the dynamic behavior of farmers across
weeks. We focus only on the demand system of the 24 farmers who only grow apricot trees.
This is the largest group of farmers that grow one single crop. Note, however, that there are
more than 500 farmers in the data set who can participate in the auction. Hence, we assume
that the distribution of the highest valuation among the other 500 farmers is exogenous to
the valuation of a given farmer, conditional on the week of the year, on the price, and on the
rain in the previous week. This is a credible assumption in our setting because it is unlikely
that any individual apricot’s farmer could aﬀect the equilibrium price in the auction.17
We now describe the econometric model. The economy consists of N rational and
forward-looking farmers, indexed by i, and one auctioneer. Water increases the farmer’s
soil’s moisture level. So, from the point of view of the farmer, there are two goods in the
economy: moisture, M , measured in liters per square meter and money, µ, measured in
pesetas. Time is denoted by t, the horizon is infinite, and the discount between periods is
  2 (0, 1). Demand is seasonal, and we denote the season by wt 2 {1, 2, ..., 52}, representing
each of the 52 weeks in a given year. In each period, the supply of water in the economy is ex-
ogenous. Farmers receive only utility for water consumed during the critical season. Water is
an intermediate good. Hence, the utility refers to the farmer’s profit, and is measured in pe-
setas, not in utils. Water purchased in any period can be carried forward to the next period,
but it “evaporates” as indicated by the evolution of soil’s moisture in the equation in (1) that
we describe below. That is, water “depreciates” at some rate   2 (0, 1). Farmers’ preferences
are represented by: u (jit,Mit, wt, pt, rt, "ijt, µit;  ,  ", ⇣) = h (jit,Mit, wt;  ) + "ijt   ⇣j   ptjit,
where h (·), is the apricot’s production function, that is common to all farmers and is strictly
increasing in the moisture level of the farmer, Mit; jit 2 {0, 1, ..., J}, is the number of units
that farmer i purchases in period t; "ijt is an additive productivity shock to farmer i in period
t, given that the farmer bought jt units of water that we describe below; µit is the amount
17In Appendix C.10 we present dynamic auction model that accounts for the within-week variation in
prices. In the structural estimation we abstract from it because there is little variation in average prices
(among several units) within a week across farmers. See Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2018) for details.
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of cash that farmer i has in period t that we describe below; pt is a scalar that represents
the price of water in the auction in period t that we describe below; ( ,  ", ⇣) is a vector of
parameters to be estimated that we describe below. Note that ⇣j represents the cost that
the farmer incurs when irrigating (this disutility could result, for example, if the farmer hires
a laborer to help with irrigation). We restrict attention to the case where farmers do not
incur irrigation costs if they do not irrigate (⇣0 = 0) and irrigation costs are constant across
units (⇣j = ⇣ if j > 0). Farmers optimization problem is subject to the constraints that
we describe when we explain the equation in (3). The function u (·) depends implicitly on
rt and  ", because the moisture and the additive productivity shocks depend on rt and  ",
respectively, as described below.
Motivated by the historical context of Mula, we assume that farmers are “hand-to-mouth”
consumers, i.e., we require that (µit   ptjit)   0, 8jit > 0 (limited liability). Further, we
assume that wealthy farmers obtain cash flow from their non-agricultural wealth. So they
always have enough cash, and the limited liability constraint is never binding. However, the
constraint could be binding for poor farmers. Poor farmers anticipate that the constraint
may be binding in the future (e.g. during the critical season) and, thus, they buy water
before the critical season, when prices of water are low. Farmers in the economy diﬀer from
each other in two ways. First, they diﬀer in their productivity shock, "ijt. Second, they
diﬀer in their wealth levels, µit. Both, "ijt and µit, are private information. We describe the
evolution of the wealth level below.
State Variables and Value Function
There are six state variables in the model.
Moisture. The moisture,Mit, measures the amount of water accumulated in the farmer’s
plot. This is a deterministic, observable variable measured in liters per square meter. The
trees on a farmer’s plot die if the soil’s moisture level falls below the permanent wilting
point, PW , which is a scalar obtained from the literature in agricultural engineering. So
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each farmer i must satisfy the constraint: Mit   PW, 8t. The evolution ofMit is given by:18
Mit = min
⇢
Mi,t 1 + rt 1 +
jit 1 · 432, 000
areai
  ET (Mit 1, wt 1) , FC
 
, (1)
where rt is the amount of rainfall, measured in liters per square meter, in Mula during
period t; 432, 000 is the number of liters in each unit of water; areai is the farmer’s plot
area, measured in square meters; ET (Mit, wt) is the adjusted evapotranspiration in period t
described in Appendix A.2; and FC is the full capacity of the farmer’s plot also described in
Appendix A.2. Moisture and seasonality are the main determinants of water demand. The
moisture level increases with rain and irrigation, and decreases over time as the accumulated
water “depreciates” (evapotranspiration). We use the equation in (1) to compute the moisture
level. Note that equation 1 accounts implicitly for decreasing marginal returns (concavity)
of water in two ways. First, because there is a maximum capacity in the farmer’s plot
represented by FC, farmers “waste” water if the moisture level increases above FC. Second,
evapotranspiration (i.e. depreciation of the water in the farmer’s plot) is greater for higher
levels of moisture. Thus, farmers with high levels of moisture in their plots “waste” more
water via greater evapotranspiration. Note that there are declining returns of irrigation
water (units bought by the farmer), even when the production function is linear in moisture.
Weekly Seasonal Eﬀect. The week of the year, wt, is the weekly seasonal eﬀect. This is
a deterministic variable with support on {1, 2, ..., 52} that evolves a follows: wt = wt 1+1 if
wt 1 < 52, and wt = 1 otherwise. Farming is a seasonal activity, and each crop has diﬀerent
water requirements depending on the season. The requirement of water for the apricot trees
is captured by its production function, h (jit,Mit, wt;  ). Because the market for water has
a weekly frequency, we include a state variable with a diﬀerent value for each week.
Price of Water and Rainfall. For each week t, the price of each unit of water in the
auction, pt, and the amount of rainfall in the town, rt, are two random variables whose joint
18See Appendix A.2 for details. The variable moisture implicitly accounts for the decreasing marginal
returns of water on area because larger plots receive smaller increase of moisture after purchasing a unit of
water as can be seen in the equation in (1).
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probability distribution is described below. The price of water is measured in pesetas, and the
rainfall is measured in liters per square meter. We model the joint probability distribution
of prices and rainfall to capture two main empirical regularities from our setting. First, the
major determinant of the price of water in the auction is weather seasonality. Second, the
variation of prices and rainfall across years is low, conditional on the week of the year (which
captures seasonality).19 Our data in this paper cover a sample of 12 years. We model the
joint evolution of the price of water in the auction in period t and rainfall in period t   1
assuming that, holding fixed the week of the year, farmers jointly draw a price-rain pair,
(pt, rt 1), i.i.d. among the 12 pairs (i.e. the 12 years of the same week) available in the
data with equal probability.20 Note that water for each week is auctioned on the Friday of
the previous week. So when a farmer jointly draws a pair price-rain, the rain corresponds
to the rain during the week previous to the irrigation. Thus, prices for the week of the
irrigation are drawn conditional on the week of the year, and the rainfall during the previous
week. The rain during the previous week captures the dynamics of droughts, i.e., prices are
systematically higher when there is no rain. See Appendix C.4 for further discussion.
Productivity Shock. The productivity shock, ✏it ⌘ (✏i0t, ..., ✏iJt), is a choice-specific
component of the utility function.21 We assume that the productivity shocks, "ijt, are drawn
i.i.d. across individuals and over time from a Gumbel distribution with CDF F ("it;  ") =
e e 
"it/ " , where  " is a parameter to be estimated. The variance of this distribution is given
by  2"⇡2/6. The higher the value of the parameter  ", the more heterogeneous the distribution
of productivity. In addition, productivity shocks are drawn i.i.d. across the choice of not
buying, j = 0, and buying, j > 0. So every farmer receives one shock, but the shock is the
same for all j > 0. Formally, let jˆ 2 {0, 1}, where jˆ = 0 if j = 0 and jˆ = 1 if j > 0. Then the
19See Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2018) for details.
20We obtain similar results by estimating the joint distribution of prices and rain nonparametrically con-
ditional on the week of the year, and then drawing price-rain pairs from this distribution, conditional on the
week of the year.
21Alternatively, one could refer to these shocks as a component of the costs of irrigation. Note that these
shocks have no impact on the marginal productivity of moisture. See Section 6 for a discussion of their
impact on welfare.
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productivity shocks "ijˆt are drawn i.i.d. across jˆ 2 {0, 1} and the shock is the same for every
unit, so "ijt = "ijˆt for j = 0 and "ijt = "ijˆt for j > 0. We present closed-form expressions for
the conditional choice probabilities using this specification in Appendix C.3.22
Cash Holdings. The cash holdings, µit, measure the amount of cash that farmer i has
in period t. The variable µit is measured in pesetas and evolves according to:
µit = µi,t 1   pt 1ji,t 1 +  t (rei; ) + ⌘it + ⌫it, (2)
where  t (rei; ) =   i0 +  1rei captures the weekly cash flow function derived from the
real estate value,  rei, minus individual i’s average weekly consumption that is constant
over time,  i0; ⌘it is the revenue that the farmer obtains from selling the harvest discussed
in the equation in (5); and ⌫it are idiosyncratic financial shock that are drawn i.i.d. across
individuals and over time from a normal distribution. The revenue, ⌘it, is zero all weeks of the
year, except the week after the harvest, when farmers sell their products and collect revenue
for the whole year. Note that  i0 represents the average weekly consumption. Therefore,
weekly consumption is not necessarily constant over time.
The value function is given by:
V (Mit, wt, pt, rt, µit, ✏ijt) ⌘ max
jit2{0,1,...,J}
{h (jit,Mit, wt;  ) + "ijt   ⇣j   ptjit+
+  E [V (Mi,t+1, wt+1, pt+1, rt+1, µi,t+1, ✏i,t+1) |Mit, wt, pt, rt, µit, ✏i,t, jit]} ,
s.t. Mit   PW, jitpt  µit, 8jit > 0,
(3)
subject to the evolution of the state variables as described above. The expectation is taken
over rt, pt, "ijt, and ⌫it. For wealthy farmers we assume that the constraint jitpt  µit is not
binding.
22Note that the choice is not binary, jit 2 {0, 1, ..., J}. In Appendix C.3 we describe two specifications
for the productivity shocks. First, for the case of i.i.d. shocks across choice alternatives, where each choice
alternative involves the purchase of a diﬀerent number of units. Second, the one presented above, which
is our preferred specification and where the productivity shocks are drawn i.i.d. across the choice of not
buying, and buying. For robustness, in Subsection C.5 in the appendix we present the demand estimates of
the structural model using both specifications, which yield similar results. This is because farmers buy more
than one unit very seldom (see Table A1 in Appendix A.1). That is, the extensive margin is what matters.
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The Apricot’s Production Function
The production function of the apricot tree is given by Torrecillas et al. (2000):
h (jit,Mt, wt;  ) = [  · (Mt   PW ) ·KS (Mt) · Z (wt)] , (4)
where h (jit,Mt, wt;  ) is the harvest at period t;   is a parameter that measures the transfor-
mation rate of water into apricots during the fruit’s growth season and the early post-harvest
stress season, and it is measured in pesetas per liter; KS (Mt) is the hydric stress coeﬃcient,
which is a weakly increasing function of moisture and is described in Appendix A.2; Z (wt)
is a dummy variable that equals 1 during weeks 18 to 32 and 0 otherwise, and it captures
the seasonal stages of the typical apricot tree cultivated in Mula, as emphasized when we
discussed Table 1. The farmer’s revenue in a given year is:23
Revenue =
32X
wt=18
  · (Mt   PW ) ·KS (Mt) . (5)
4 Estimation
We estimate the parameters that characterize demand, ⇥ ⌘ ( ,  ", ⇣), using data from
wealthy farmers, and excluding data from poor farmers who may be liquidity constrained.
To perform the estimation we assume that there is no persistent unobserved heterogeneity
that aﬀects the production function of wealthy and poor farmers diﬀerently (i.e. no dynamic
sample selection on unobservables). We also assume that wealthy farmers are never liquid-
ity constrained. Although the latter assumption is not necessary to identify the model, it
simplifies the estimation (see Appendices C.1 and C.8 for discussions), and is motivated by
the empirical context as discussed in Section 2.
23The production function measures production in pesetas. The actual price at which the production is
sold is determined in the output market. We do not have data on the price at which this production is sold.
So we recover the revenue of the farmers up to this constant (the common price at which the production of
all farmers is sold in apricot’s market). This price only shifts the revenue function of all (wealthy and poor)
farmers. So it does not aﬀect our welfare analysis.
23
4.1 Demand Estimates
We construct a two-step conditional choice probability (CCP) estimator (Hotz and Miller,
1993) to estimate the parameters that characterize demand.
Step 1. We compute transition probability matrices for the following observable state
variables: moisture, week, price, and rain. As described above, the productivity shocks,
"ijt, are assumed to be i.i.d. Gumbel, so they can be integrated analytically. The evolution
of moisture depends on both the farmers’ decisions to buy water and rainfall. Therefore,
certain values of moistness are never reached in the sample, even when their probability of
occurrence is nonzero. To estimate demand, however, we need to integrate the value function
for each possible combination of state variables in the state space. Thus, we first estimate the
CCP using the values of the state space reached in the sample, using only data on wealthy
farmers. Then we use the CCP estimator to predict the CCP on the values of the state space
unreached in the sample.24
Step 2. We build an estimator similar to the one by proposed by Hotz et al. (1994). We
use the transition matrices to forward simulate the value function from the equation in (3).25
This gives us the predicted CCP by the model as a function of the parameter vector, ⇥. We
estimate the parameter vector ⇥ using a GMM estimator based on the moment conditions
proposed by Hotz et al. (1994).
Identification. The exclusion restriction is that wealthy farmers are not liquidity con-
strained. Under this exclusion restriction, the identification of ⇥ follows the standard ar-
guments (e.g. see Hotz Hotz and Miller, 1993; Hotz et al., 1994; Rust, 1996; Magnac and
Thesmar, 2002; and Aguirregabiria, 2005). In our case the transformation rate,  , is identi-
fied from the variation in purchasing patterns across seasons, and the variation in moisture
levels across farmers within the same season. The irrigation cost, ⇣, is constant across units,
24We estimate the CCP both non-parametrically, using kernel methods to smooth both discrete and
continuous variables, and parametrically, using a logistic distribution, i.e., a multinomial logit regression.
See Appendix C.8 for details.
25For the initial condition of the moisture we follow Hendel and Nevo (2006, p. 1,647), and use the
estimated distribution of moisture to generate its initial distribution, as described in Appendix C.1.
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Table 3: Structural Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transformation rate
(18  week  32):
  Linear term:  ˆL 0.1584 0.1790 0.2124 0.0734(0.0067) (0.0094) (0.0026) (0.0064)
  Quadratic term:  ˆQ   1.36e-04   6.19e-05(1.59e-05) (8.82e-06)
Irrigating cost: ⇣ˆ 24.3755 182.174 78.8924 34.3495(6.9848) (13.2357) (3.1994) (6.76245)
Scale parameter of 1.0100 1.0854 0.9361 1.0144
Gumbel distribution:  ˆ" (0.2568) (0.1286) (0.0393) (0.1048)
Area heterogeneity No No Yes Yes
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis. See Subsection 6.1 for details about this table.
and independent of the moisture level. It is identified from the variation in the level of
prices, and the farmer’s decision of buying vs. not buying, holding constant the level of
moisture. Finally, the parameter  " represents the inverse of the marginal utility of income
in our model, and is identified because our specification for the utility function of the farmer
on page 18 does not include a parameter that multiplies the price of water. Such parameter
is typically called “↵” in the industrial organization literature (see Berry et al., 1995; Hen-
del and Nevo, 2006), and measures the income sensitivity of a consumer. Because we are
estimating a production function, the utility function on page 18 is in pesetas, not in utils.
5 Estimation Results
Table 3 displays the estimation results for the demand parameters, ⇥ ⌘ ( ,  ", ⇣), from the
demand model in equation in 3 using the estimation procedure from Subsection 4.1. We
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present two sets of estimates with diﬀerent diﬀerent discrete types of farmers, who diﬀer
only in their plot’s area as described below. In columns 1 and 2 we perform the estimation
with only one type of farmer who has the median number of trees from the sample (“Area
heterogeneity: No” ). This means that when we forward simulate the value function (as
outlined in Subsection 4.1), areai from the equation in (4) is set to the median area for
all individual farmers i. In column 1 we use the apricot production function as outlined
in the equation in (4). The estimated transformation rate is  ˆL = 0.16. For robustness,
in column 2 we add a quadratic term for moisture,  Q, to the specification in column 1
to incorporate potential increasing or decreasing marginal returns explicitly. However, the
estimated coeﬃcient for the quadratic term of the transformation rate is small in magnitude,
 ˆQ = 1.36e 04. In columns 3 and 4 we repeat the estimation from the previous two columns
using ten diﬀerent discrete types of farmers, who diﬀer only in their plot’s area (“Area
heterogeneity: Yes” ). The area of each type corresponds to the number of trees owned by
the wealthy farmers in the data. There are twelve wealthy farmers in the data, but there are
two pairs of farmers with the same area. Each discrete type has the same probability. This
means that when we forward simulate the value function as outlined in Subsection 4.1, the
value of areai from the equation in (4) is drawn uniformly at random from a distribution
with discrete support at the points {area1, area2, . . . , area10}. In Table 3 we report the
mean ⇥ ⌘ ( ,  ", ⇣) across types. The estimated scale parameter of the distribution of
idiosyncratic productivity,  ˆ", is similar in magnitude across the specifications. The higher
the parameter  ", the higher the variance of the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity.
When  " = 1, the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity is a standard Gumbel. Finally
note that the estimated irrigation cost has the expected sign and is sensible in magnitude.26
26In Appendix C.5 we present additional estimates of the model using a diﬀerent specification for the
productivity shocks. The overall estimates are similar to the specifications in Table 3. In a previous draft
we also obtained similar results to the ones in Table 3 using: (i) an specification that allows for diﬀerent
transformation rates for pre-season (18  week  23) and on-season (24  week  32), and (ii) an
autoregressive specification for the productivity error term.
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6 Welfare
In this section we use the estimated demand system to compare welfare under auctions,
quotas, and the highest-valuation allocation.27 In our model there are two potential sources
of ineﬃciency in the allocation of water. First, the allocation could be ineﬃcient because
some farmers receive water at a time when they are relatively unproductive. This ineﬃciency
arises because farmers are ex post heterogeneous in productivity, so we call it ineﬃciency
due to heterogeneity. Second, the allocation could be ineﬃcient because some farmers receive
water when their soil moisture level is relatively high. This ineﬃciency arises because the
production function is concave in water, so we call it ineﬃciency due to concavity. Quotas
allocate water units uniformly, so they always create ineﬃciency due to heterogeneity, but
never ineﬃciency due to concavity in units bought. Markets would correct both ineﬃciencies
if there were no liquidity constraints, but would create both ineﬃciencies when liquidity
constraints are present. If farmers are heterogeneous and the production function is linear in
the number of units bought, markets are always more eﬃcient than quotas. Quotas are more
eﬃcient than markets when there is large heterogeneity in wealth, and small heterogeneity
in productivity. Markets are more eﬃcient in the opposite case. In the general case where
there is heterogeneity in both wealth and productivity, the eﬃciency of markets relative to
quotas is ambiguous.
In our empirical setting, large heterogeneities in wealth create liquidity constraints. Due
to the dynamics created by the moisture, liquidity constraints create ineﬃciency due to
concavity by allocating water to wealthy farmers with relatively high moisture levels. The
heterogeneity in productivity is captured by the productivity shocks, "ijt. Although these
shocks are drawn i.i.d. across individuals and over time, the estimated value of  " measures
the degree of heterogeneity. The higher the value of the parameter  ", the more hetero-
geneous the distribution of productivity. Because ours is a discrete choice model and the
27The HV corresponds to the static first-best allocation. However, due to dynamics and the possibility
of strategic delaying in the decisions to purchase water it may not coincide with the dynamic first-best
allocation, which is a complex problem that is outside the scope of this paper.
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error term, ✏ijt, is choice-specific, the relevant measure for eﬃciency are the diﬀerences in
✏ijt across choices conditional on the choice, not the ✏ijt by itself, nor the unconditional
diﬀerence. For example, in the case in which J = 1, the farmer chooses whether to buy
one unit or not to buy. The farmer balances the diﬀerence in utility between buying or
not, considering both the observable and unobservable (for the econometrician) components.
The probability of a farmer buying water increases with the expectation of the diﬀerence
in ✏ijt, i.e., with E [✏i1t   ✏i0t]. By construction, the unconditional mean of the diﬀerences
in the error term is zero. Hence, in the quotas system, because the farmers cannot choose
when to irrigate, the conditional and unconditional expectations of the diﬀerence in the
error terms are zero: E [✏i1t   ✏i0t]= E [✏i1t   ✏i0t|j = 1]=E [✏i0t   ✏i1t|j = 0]=0. However, in
the auction system, farmers do choose when to irrigate, and the conditional expectation is
always positive. Farmers are more likely to irrigate when their unobserved utility of irriga-
tion is positive, ✏i1t > ✏i0t, and they are more likely not to irrigate when their unobserved
utility for no irrigation is positive, ✏i0t > ✏i1t. This implies that under the auction system:
E [✏i1t   ✏i0t|j = 1] > 0 and E [✏i0t   ✏i1t|j = 0] > 0. In other words, gains from trade are
realized in the auction system. The greater the parameter  ", the greater these gains from
trade. In our empirical setting, gains from trade are translated into the timing of irrigation.
Farmers trade with each other to irrigate during their preferred weeks of the year.
6.1 Welfare Measures
We now describe how we construct the welfare measures. We compute two welfare measures,
the yearly mean revenue and welfare, both per tree and per farmer. For both measures we do
not take into account water expenses because they represent transfers, and we are interested
in welfare. The only diﬀerence between revenue and welfare is due to the choice specific
unobservable component, ✏ijt, as explained above.28 We compute the welfare measures for
28Welfare is always greater than revenue under the auction system because the former accounts for the
diﬀerences in the choice specific unobservable component. Not accounting for these diﬀerences would under-
estimate welfare under auctions.
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Table 4: Welfare Results
Auctions Quotas High Valuation
complete complete complete
units units units
Ac Revenue Ac Welfare Qc Qc75% Qc50% Qc25% HVc
Welfare measures: (mean
per farmer, per tree, per year)
- All farmers pre-season 972.22 978.82 825.80 907.90 978.37 1042.04 1,055.03
(24 farmers)
- All farmers on-season 392.05 396.85 321.83 367.73 405.66 438.43 445.28
(24 farmers)
- Poor farmers whole season 1,178.04 1,189.44 1,152.79 1,295.77 1,395.70 1,444.91 1,448.40
(12 farmers)
- Wealthy farmers whole season 1,550.50 1,561.91 1,142.48 1,255.47 1,372.75 1,516.03 1,552.22
(12 farmers)
- All farmers whole season 1,364.27 1,375.67 1,147.64 1,275.62 1,384.02 1,480.47 1,500.31
(24 farmers)
Amount of water allocated:
(mean number of units per farmer)
- Poor farmers whole season
(12 farmers) 19.42 19.42 25.62 27.09 27.44 26.52 26.39
- Wealthy farmers whole season
(12 farmers) 33.33 33.33 27.13 25.66 25.31 26.23 26.36
- Total units allocated whole season 633 633 633 633 633 633 633
(24 farmers)
Notes: See Appendix C.7 for a discussion about the computation of the welfare measures.
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the following allocation mechanisms: (1) auctions using complete units, Ac, wherein complete
water units are assigned to the farmer who bought them as observed in the data; (2) quotas
with random assignment of complete units, Qc, wherein every time we observe a farmer
purchasing a unit of water under the auction system, the complete unit of water is assigned
uniformly at random, proportional to their amount of land, among all farmers; (3) quotas
with sequential assignment of complete units, QcX%, wherein every time we observe a farmer
purchasing a unit of water under the auction system, the complete unit of water is assigned
uniformly at random, proportional to their amount of land, among the X% of farmers who
did not receive irrigation the longest; and (4) the highest-valuation allocation using complete
units, HV c, wherein every time we observe a farmer purchasing a unit of water under the
auction system, the complete unit of water is assigned to the farmer who values the water
the most. In all cases, Ac, Qc, QcX%, and HV c, we compute the welfare measures using the
actual allocation of water from the data under the auctions system (i.e. the total amount of
water allocated in all mechanisms is the same), and the estimates from column 3 from Table
3.29 As explained in Subsection 2.2, the quota system in Mula allocates units in sequential
rounds of three weeks. So Qc25% is closest to this system. Below we describe how we
compute the welfare measures under each mechanism. See Appendix C.7 for details.
Auctions using Complete Units (Ac)
We compute revenue and welfare, as explained above. For both poor and wealthy farmers,
we use the moisture level resulting from their actual purchase decisions.
Quotas (Qc)
Revenue and welfare coincide under the quota system because farmers do not choose when
to irrigate. We only report one measure that we call “welfare.” As explained in Section 2, in
this paper we focus on the 24 farmers who only grow apricot trees. These farmers bought
29We obtain similar results simulating the purchase decisions under the auction system, and then using
the resulting allocation to compute the welfare under quotas and HV c.
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633 units of water under the auction system during the period under analysis. Under the
quota system, we allocate the same number of units of water, 633 units, in the same week
when these units were bought under the auction. We consider several quota scenarios that
we call QcX%, and are defined as follows. Every time we observe that a farmer bought a
unit of water during the auction on a particular date, the complete unit of water is assigned
uniformly at random, proportional to their amount of land, among the X% of farmers who
did not receive irrigation the longest, on the same date. In other words, units are allocated
sequentially. Note that Qc100% corresponds to the special case of a quota with random
assignment of complete units, called Qc above. In Table 4 we report the mean welfare
measures across simulations.
Highest Valuation using Complete Units (HV c)
We compute the highest-valuation allocation using complete units (HV c) as follows. Every
time we observe that a farmer bought a unit of water during the auction on a particular
date, the complete unit of water is assigned to the farmer who has the lowest moisture level
on that date. This corresponds to the farmer who has been the longest without irrigation.
6.2 Welfare Results
Table 4 displays welfare results under auctions, quotas, and the HV c allocation. For the
welfare analysis in Table 4 we use the results from specification 3 in Table 3. We report
the mean welfare per farmer, per tree, and per year. The bottom part of the table shows
the mean number of units per farmer during the whole period under analysis under each
mechanism. The total amount of water, 633 units, is the same across all mechanisms. The
diﬀerences in welfare across columns are a consequence of diﬀerences in moisture levels across
farmers.
As expected under the auction system, poor farmers have a lower welfare than wealthy
farmers. The quota system increases poor farmers’ welfare, and decreases wealthy farmers’
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welfare. Overall the quotas Qc25% produce 7.6% ((1,480.47 1,375.67)/1,375.67) more welfare per
tree than auctions, Ac. Table 4 shows that the following ranking holds in terms of eﬃciency:
HV c > Qc25% > Qc50% ⇠= Ac, where a “greater than” inequality indicates greater welfare,
and where the symbol “⇠=” indicates that the welfare is not statistically diﬀerent. That is,
randomly allocating the complete units of water, in proportion to amount of land, results in
a decrease in eﬃciency relative to auctions. In Qc50%, complete units of water are allocated
among the 50 percent of farmers who have received less water in the past, in proportion to
their amount of land. The welfare under Qc50% is not statistically diﬀerent than the welfare
under Ac. In Qc25%, complete units of water are allocated among the 25 percent of farmers
who have received less water in the past, in proportion to their amount of land. The welfare
under Qc25% is greater than under Ac. In Mula, the quota allocation mechanism was similar
to Qc25% because every farmer was assigned a certain amount of water every three weeks
(the duration of a round, or tanda), proportional to their plot’s size.
Auctions, Quotas, and Highest Valuation. Figure 2 shows the welfare comparison
among auctions Ac, the HV c allocation, and quotas QcX% for diﬀerent values of X. Note
that auctions Ac and HV c are constant in X. The figure shows the mean welfare per farmer,
per tree, and per year. The welfare measures are the same as in Table 4. The main diﬀerence
between HV c and Ac is that poor farmers do not buy much water during the critical season
under Ac. Randomly allocating complete units of water results in a decrease in eﬃciency
relative to auctions. Lower welfare results from the decreasing marginal returns of water
of the apricot production function. Although all farmers receive the same amount of water
per tree, the timing of the allocation is important. For example, consider the case of two
identical farmers, A and B. Suppose that there are four units of water to be allocated in
four consecutive weeks, 1, 2, 3, and 4. Allocating the first two units during weeks 1 and 2
to farmer A, and the second two units during weeks 3 and 4 to farmer B, results in a lower
welfare than allocating the first unit to A, the second unit to B, the third unit to A, and
the fourth to B. As X decreases, the quota system QcX% allocates units among the farmers
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Figure 2: Welfare Comparison: Auctions, Quotas, and Highest Valuation
Notes: See Appendix C.7 for a discussion about the computation of the welfare measures. Confidence inter-
vals account for uncertainty about the estimated parameters (by drawing from the asymptotic distribution)
and across simulations.
who irrigated less in the past. This is similar to the HV c allocation, where water is allocated
to the farmer who values water the most. In the limit, as X decreases enough, the welfare
under QcX% is similar to the welfare under HV c. In our empirical setting, varying X is
equivalent to varying the duration of the round. Long rounds indicate that farmers do not
irrigate often, while short rounds indicate that farmers incur irrigation costs often.
Yearly Results. Figure 3 shows the welfare results by year, from 1955 to 1965, and by
allocation mechanism, Ac, Qc, Qc50%, and HV c. There is substantial variation across years
due to variation in rainfall. Revenue is the lowest for both poor and wealthy farmers during
1962-63, the driest years in our sample. The top two panels in Figure 3 display welfare
disaggregated by poor and wealthy farmers under Ac, Qc, Qc50%, and HV c. Although
the overall performance of Ac is similar to Qc, the distribution is diﬀerent. Wealthy farmers
perform better under Ac than under Qc50%, as expected. Poor farmers perform better under
Qc50% than under Ac. During dry years, such as 1963 or 1964, poor farmers perform better
under Qc than under Ac. The diﬀerence between Ac and HV c is the highest in 1963, the
year with the lowest rain in the sample. The drought increased the price of water relative to
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Figure 3: Welfare by Year.
Notes: See Appendix C.7 for a discussion about the computation of the welfare measures.
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the other years in the sample. The negative impact of this drought on poor farmers under
Ac was larger than its positive impact on wealthy farmers.
In this paper we analyzed the welfare implications of the institutional change from auc-
tions to quotas for farmers who grew only apricots. Note that the welfare results do not
apply necessarily to farmers who grew other crops, or to farmers who had a mix of several
crops. In particular, farmers who had a summer (e.g. apricot) and a winter (e.g. oranges)
crop can smooth spending throughout the year, and may not benefit much from the quotas.
7 Discussion
In this section we discuss the fit of our model to the empirical setting in Mula. See Appendix
D for a thorough discussion.
Unobserved Heterogeneity. The production diﬀerences in Table 4 are attributable
to diﬀerences in soil’s moisture levels because our specification assumes that all farmers are
equally productive, up to an idiosyncratic productivity shock. An alternative explanation
would be that production diﬀerences are due to unobserved diﬀerences in productivity. For
example, it could be that wealthy farmers used additional productive inputs, such as manure,
in greater quantities than did poor farmers. Thus, poor farmers’ production would be lower
than wealthy farmers’ production due to both diﬀerences in soil moisture levels, and greater
use of these additional productive inputs.
Although we cannot rule out this argument explicitly, it does not aﬀect our counterfactual
results from Table 4. We cannot rule it out explicitly because we have no data about the
relative use of these additional productive inputs, and our econometric specification does
not allow for persistent diﬀerences in productivity among farmers. However, it does not
aﬀect our counterfactual results in the historical context of Mula. Artificial fertilizers were
not introduced in Mula until the 1970s. Farmers did use manure and mules when farming
the land. If poor farmers faced liquidity constraints when buying water, it is reasonable
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that they also faced liquidity constraints when buying these additional inputs. Therefore,
if wealthy farmers used additional productive inputs in greater quantities than did poor
farmers under the market system, then the transition from markets to quotas would increase
the poor farmers’ production more than we predicted in the counterfactual from Table 4.
Under quotas, farmers do not have to make large payments for water, leaving them extra
cash to buy additional productive inputs. In other words, poor farmers are less likely to
be liquidity constrained to buy additional inputs under quotas. Thus, even if poor farmers
were less productive than wealthy farmers under the market, they would be as productive
as wealthy farmers under quotas. We further explore this issue in Appendix D.2, where we
generalize the model and allow for correlation between farmers’ wealth and productivity.30
Liquidity Constraints vs. Risk Aversion or Impatience. One concern when iden-
tifying liquidity constraints is the similar empirical implications when agents face liquidity
constraints and when agents are risk averse. In particular, if poor farmers are more risk
averse, their purchase of water before the critical season (i.e. before uncertainty about rain
is realized) is consistent with both liquidity constraints and risk aversion. We could use the
response of poor farmers to their purchase timing to investigate this concern. The main dif-
ference in farmers’ behavior under liquidity constraints and risk aversion occurs during the
summer, when prices are high. On the one hand, if poor farmers face liquidity constraints,
they would not be able to buy water when the price is high, even if the moisture level in
their plots is low. On the other hand, if farmers are unconstrained but risk averse, they
would have the same demand for water as wealthy farmers during the summer (i.e. after
uncertainty about rain is realized), conditional on soil’s moisture levels. In Table 2, column
4 we show that holding the moisture level fixed, poor farmers buy less water than wealthy
farmers. Following the results in this table, along with the opinions presented above, we
conclude that poor farmers faced liquidity constraints. The same argument rules out the
30An alternative would be to allow for persistent diﬀerences in productivity among farmers, thus allowing
for dynamic sample selection on unobservables. For some papers in this active area of research see, e.g.,
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Norets (2009), Arcidiacono and Miller (2011), Hu and Shum (2012), Blevins
(2016), Connault (2016), and the references there.
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possibility that the results are driven by poor farmers being more impatient (lower discount
factor) than wealthy farmers. If poor farmers were more impatient, their moisture level
would be always lower than that of wealthy farmers because an extra peseta spent on water
has an immediate cost, and a future reward. However, poor farmers have higher moisture
levels than wealthy farmers before the critical season, lower moisture levels during the crit-
ical season, and again higher moisture levels right after the critical season (Figure 1). This
behavior rules out diﬀerences in discount factors between wealthy and poor farmers.
8 Concluding Remarks
We empirically investigate the welfare eﬀect of a historical institutional change from markets
to quotas in the presence of frictions. Both systems allocated water to farmers for irrigation.
A market institution was active for more than 700 years in the southern Spanish town
of Mula. In 1966, a fixed quota system replaced the auction. Under the quota system,
farmers who owned a plot of land in the irrigated area were entitled to a fixed amount
of water, proportional to the size of their plot. In the absence of frictions, a market is
eﬃcient because it allocates water according to the valuation of farmers. When frictions
are present, however, markets may not be eﬃcient. Frictions arose in Mula because farmers
had to pay in cash for the water that they purchased, but did not always have enough
cash during the critical season, when they needed the water the most. When farmers are
liquidity constrained, the eﬃciency of auctions relative to quotas is theoretically ambiguous.
It is then an empirical question to assess which institution is more eﬃcient. We show that
some farmers were liquidity constrained in Mula, as some historians have suggested. Poor
farmers bought less water than wealthy farmers during the critical season, and obtained
lower revenue per tree as a result. To compute welfare under auctions and quotas, we
estimated the dynamic demand system under the auction accounting for three main features
of the empirical setting: intertemporal substitution, liquidity constraints, and seasonality.
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We used the estimated demand system to compare welfare under markets, quotas, and the
highest-valuation allocation.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, from a historical perspective, we pro-
vide empirical evidence of a source of ineﬃciency in water markets. Second, from an indus-
trial organization perspective, we propose a dynamic demand model that includes storability,
seasonality, and liquidity constraints. Ignoring the presence of liquidity constraints biases
the estimated inverse demand and demand elasticity downwards. To perform the estimation
we used only the choices of farmers who were not liquidity constrained; then, we used the
model to infer the conduct of all farmers in a counterfactual setting in which no one was
liquidity constrained. Our approach may also be applied to other settings by identifying, for
example, rational agents, informed consumers, buyers aﬀected by inertia, or other frictions,
and simulating counterfactuals where those features are not present.
Our analysis is subject to several limitations. First, the empirical results in this paper
apply only to the empirical setting in Mula. One should not conclude that all water markets
are ineﬃcient. We have presented an empirical framework incorporating the main compo-
nents found in other water markets: seasonal demand, storability, and liquidity constraints.
Our framework can be adapted to assess the eﬃciency of water markets in other empirical
settings. Second, the results from our welfare analysis in Mula only apply to the 24 apricot
farmers used in our sample. Finally, our model does not allow for systematic (or perma-
nent) diﬀerences in productivity across farmers. We believe this is sensible in the empirical
context of Mula for the reasons discussed in the paper. Our goal was to investigate how
the institutional change, from markets to quotas, aﬀected eﬃciency for apricot farmers in
Mula. However, allowing for systematic or serially correlated diﬀerences in productivity may
generate dynamic sample selection on unobservables, and may be a central explanation in
favor of the eﬃciency of markets in general. Enriching the model in such dimension is an
avenue for future research.
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Appendix
This is the web appendix for “The Illiquidity of Water Markets: Eﬃcient Institutions for Wa-
ter Allocation in Southeastern Spain,” by Javier D. Donna and José-Antonio Espín-Sánchez.
A Additional Description of the Data, Moisture, and Pre-
liminary Analysis
In this section we present detailed information regarding the data collection, and the moisture
computation.
A.1 Additional Description of the Data.
A.1.1 Auction Data.
The mechanism to allocate water to the farmers was a sequential outcry ascending price
(or English) auction. The auctioneer sold each of the units sequentially and independently
of each other. The auctioneer recorded the name of the buyer of every unit and the price
paid by the winner. The farmers could not store water in their plots. Reselling water was
forbidden.
The basic selling unit was a cuarta (quarter), the right to use water that flowed through
the main channel for three hours. Water was stored at the De La Cierva dam. Water flowed
from the dam through the channels at approximately 40 liters per second. As a result, one
cuarta carried approximately 432,000 liters of water. During our sample period, auctions were
carried out every Friday. Every week, 40 cuartas were auctioned: four cuartas for irrigation
during the day (from 7:00 AM to 7:00 PM) and four cuartas for irrigation during the night
(from 7:00 PM to 7:00 AM), for each weekday (Monday to Friday). The auctioneer first sold
the 20 cuartas corresponding to the night-time, and then the 20 cuartas corresponding to
the day-time. Within each day and night group, units were sold beginning with Monday’s
four cuartas, and finishing with Friday’s.
Auction data encompasses 602 weeks, and can be divided into three categories based
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on bidding behavior and water availability: (i) Normal periods (300 weeks), when for each
transaction the name of the winner, price paid, date and time of the irrigation was registered
for each auction; (ii) No-supply periods (295 weeks), when due to water shortage in the river
or damage to the dam or channel—usually because of intense rain—no auction was carried
out; and (iii) No-demand periods (7 weeks), when some units were not sold due to lack of
demand due to recent rain, and the price dropped to zero. The sample for the empirical
analysis focuses on the period from 1955 until 1966.
Figure A1 shows a sample from original data for May 17, 1963, obtained from the historical
archive. Units 1 to 4 are the units bought on Monday during day (unit 1 corresponds to the
right to irrigate from 7AM to 10AM, unit 2 from 10AM to 1PM, unit 3 from 1PM to 4PM,
and unit 4 from 4PM to 7PM). Similarly, units 5 to 8 are the units bought on Tuesday during
day; units 9 to 12 are the units on Wednesday during day; units 13 to 16 are the units on
Thursday during day; and units 17 to 20 are the units on Friday during day. From the data
we observe the name of the farmer who won each of the auctions, and the price paid by each
farmer.
Figure A2 shows the weekly average price paid by the farmers during our sample period.
There is substantial variation in prices, that range from 0.005 to 2007 pesetas. In the fall of
1955, a large flood damaged the dam for several months. Thus, auctions were not run until
the next fall. In some dry years, like 1961-63, auctions were not run in winter, causing the
prices to soar in spring and summer.
Figure A2: Prices of water 1955-66 (pesetas).
Notes: Weekly average price of the water sold at auction in Mula, from January, 1955 until July 1966, when
the last auction was run.
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Figure A1: Sample of Auction Sheet.
Notes: Sample pictures of the data from the Municipal Archive in Mula, Section Heredamiento de Aguas
(HA). This pictures correspond to the same sheet of paper, containing the information of the winners and
price paid for the 40 units sold on April 29, 1955.
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Figure A3: Weekly Rainfall in Mula (mm).
Notes: Weekly rainfall in Mula from date from the AEMET.
A.1.2 Rainfall Data.
We also link auction data to daily rainfall data for Mula, which we obtain from the Agen-
cia Estatal de Metereología, AEMET (the National Meteorological Agency). Mediterranean
climate rainfall occurs mainly in spring and fall while peak water requirements for products
cultivated in the region are reached in spring and summer. During these months, from April
to August, more frequent irrigation is recommended because the tree’s production quality is
more sensitive to water deficits. Figure A3 shows that there are only a few weeks with posi-
tive rainfall. In our sample, the weekly rainfall exceeded the yearly average on two occasions,
in September 1957 and in October 1960.
A.1.3 Agricultural Census Data.
We also link auction data to the data that we collected from the 1954/55 agricultural census
from Spain, which provides information on individual characteristics of farmers’ land. The
census was conducted by the Spanish government to enumerate all cultivated soil, production
crops, and agricultural assets available in the country. Individual characteristics of farm land
owned by potential bidders, who we link with the names in the auctions data, include the
type of land and location, area, number of trees, production, and the price at which this
production was sold in the census year. There are approximately 500 diﬀerent bidders in our
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Figure A4: Samples of Agricultural Census (left) and Urban Real Estate Taxes registry (left).
Notes: Sample pictures of the data from the Municipal Archive in Mula. Left: card from the Agricultural
Census in 1955. The farmer (Miguel Egea Garcia) lived in Mula (15 Ollerias). He was an owner of three
plots, one one of them uncultivated, with an extension of two Tahúllas, with 60 apricot trees. In 1954 he
obtained 2,500 Kg of apricots which he sold for 4,000 pesetas in bulk. Right: sheet from the Urban Real
Estate Taxes registry, corresponding to 1954. The citizen in registry 458 (Miguel Egea Garcia) owned a house
in 15 Ollerias for which he paid 64 pesetas in taxes.
sample.
Figure A4 (left) shows a sample card of a farmer taken from the agricultural census data.
It can be seen in Table 1 in the paper, that Area and the number of trees vary considerably
across farmers. For the case of apricot-only farmers, on average each farmer had 86 trees
and bought 31.5 units of water during the period 1955-66.
As regards the composition of the farmers’ plots in Mula, the most common agricultural
trees were oranges (33 percent) and apricots (29 percent), followed by lemons (12 percent)
and peaches (5 percent). These farmers grew a wide variety of vegetables, including tomatoes,
red peppers, cucumbers, and also potatoes. Vegetables and potatoes were complementary
to the trees. Fruit trees produce greater returns than vegetables, but require irrigation at
specific times of the year, and up to five years to reach maturity. By contrast, vegetables can
be harvested a few months after being sowed, but they have lower returns. Hence, they can
produce high output during a rainy year, and their cost of drying up during drought is low
because they can be sown again the year after.
A.1.4 Real Estate Tax Data.
Figure A4 (right) shows a sample sheet taken from the urban real estate tax registry. We can
see how the name and addresses match uniquely, so we know the person in the auction data,
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the agricultural census and the tax registry is indeed the same farmer. The data is held at
the Municipal Archive in Mula, in the General Section. It contains the public records of the
real estate income taxes paid annually for each individual who owned an urban property in
the town of Mula. We first link the names in the auction data to those in the agricultural
census data. Then we link those names to the urban real estate data. The value in the real
estate data records corresponds to the taxable income for urban real estate only. Farmers
had to pay an annual tax equal to 17% of the taxable income. That is, 17% of the rental
value of the properties, not the stock value of the properties. The rural real estate holdings
were subject to diﬀerent taxes and are kept in a diﬀerent directory.
Among the poor farmers, 10 out of 12 owned no urban real estate, the other two that we
consider “poor” owned a small house, with a taxable value that is approximately one hundred
times lower than that of the wealthiest of the farmers. In our estimates we found that the
two “poor” farmers who owned a house were also never liquidity constrained. The average
taxable base for urban real estate is 969 pesetas for the wealthy farmers and 6 pesetas for
the poor farmers.
The taxable base is useful for relative comparisons, because it uses the same formula
for all urban properties. This is amplified in the case of apricot-only farmers because the
comparison is between farmers (ten out of twelve were poor) who mostly owned no urban
real estate at all, making the taxable base particularly indicative of the wealth diﬀerence
between the farmers. Note, however, that the conversion from taxable base to actual value is
not straightforward. The taxable base is equivalent to the estimated annual rent (net from
maintenance costs) that the owner could get from their property. The average value of the
tax base of a house in the town was about 40 pesetas. The values that we obtain from wealthy
farmers are much higher because they include multiple properties, and for the case of the
very wealthy, mansions.
A.1.5 Summary Statistics.
Table A1 shows the summary statistics of selected variables used in the empirical analysis.
A-9
Table A1: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables.
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Med Max No. obs.
Weekly rain (mm) 8.29 37.08 0 0 423.00 602
Water price (pesetas)a 326.16 328.45 0.005 217.9 2,007 602
Real estate tax (pesetas) 482.10 1,053.6 0 48 8,715 496
Area (ha) 2.52 5.89 0.024 1.22 100.1 496
Number of treesb 311.3 726.72 3 150 12,360 496
Units bought 0.0295 0.3020 0 0 4 145,684
Notes: The sample refers to all farmers. There are 496 census cards in the archive. We matched 242 individuals to the auction
data. The agricultural census include farmers who have only secano, or dry, lands and thus, are not in our sample. The sample
after the matching process consists of 602 weeks, and 242 individuals for a total of 145,684 observations.
a Water price is the weekly average price in the auction. b Number of trees includes vines.
A.2 Additional Description of the Moisture and the Production
Function.
This section follows closely Allen et al. (2006). Trees are traditionally positioned in a square
grid, each trunk 9 meters (m) from each other. Hence, there is a tree for every 81 m2. This
corresponds to our data in which, for apricot trees, the average ratio of trees per m2 is 79.96
m2/tree and the ratio between total number of trees and total area is 78.25 m2/tree. These
numbers are slightly smaller than 81 m2/tree because some farmers place some trees very
close to the edge of their plot.
Evapotranspiration (ET) is the loss of water suﬀered by the trees due to both Evaporation
(E) of the water stored underground and Transpiration (T) of the water stored within the
plant through the surface of the leaves. We use the method recommended by the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) to compute the evolution of the moisture due to ET:
ETc = Kc · ET0,
where ETc is the weekly ET of crop c, ET0 is the weekly reference ET and Kc is the
crop coeﬃcient. Both ETc and ET0 are measured as millimeters per week (mm/week). ET
is aﬀected by climatic factors: radiation, air temperature, atmospheric humidity, and wind
speed. The eﬀect of those parameters is summarized in ET0. We use the estimations of ET0
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Figure A5: Evolution of the crop coeﬃcient Kcb,t over a year.
Notes: This figure represents the relationship between the crop coeﬃcient Kcb,t and the weekly calendar, for
apricot trees in southern Spain. The parameters are taken from Allen et al. (2006). The graph is similar to
Figure 37 in Allen et al. (2006).
in Franco at al. (2000).
ET would also change depending on the phase of the growing cycle:
ETcb,t = Kcb,t · ET0.
We can then distinguish four phases (initial, development, median, and final) in the
growing season. Following (Allen et al., 2006, p. 107) we have that Lini = 20, Ldev = 70,
Lmed = 120, and Lfin = 60; 270 days in total, finishing at the critical season. The coeﬃcient
Kcb,t is flat during the initial period (with Kcb,ini = 0.35). It is linearly increasing during the
development period until it reaches the median period. It is flat during the median period
(with Kcb,med = 0.85). It is linearly decreasing during the final period (with Kcb,fin = 0.60
on average). It is then linear during the no-growth period until it reaches the initial period
during the next year at Kcb,ini.1 Figure A5 displays the evolution of the coeﬃcient Kcb,t over
a year.
1Allen et al. (2006) formula (66). Coeﬃcients for apricot trees without soil cover, with potential frosts,
Table 17 (page 140).
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A.2.1 Evapotranspiration Under Hydric Stress.
ETc refers to the ET of crop c under standard conditions. We should nonetheless adjust the
value of ETc (ETc,adj) when those conditions are not met. When the soil is wet, the water
has a high potential energy, meaning that it can be easily absorbed by the roots of the tree.
When the soil is dry, water is not so easily absorbed by the roots. When the moisture of the
plot falls below a certain threshold, we say that the crop is under Hydric Stress (HS). The
eﬀects of HS are incorporated by multiplying Kcb by the Hydric Stress coeﬃcient KS:
ETc,adj = KS ·Kcb · ET0.
Water availability refers to the ability of soil to keep water available for plants. After
a heavy rain or irrigation, the soil will drain water until the full capacity is reached. The
Full Capacity (FC) of a soil represents the moisture that a well drained soil keeps against
gravitational forces, i.e., the moisture of a soil when the downward vertical drainage has
decreased substantially. In our case:
FC = 1000 · ✓FC · Zr,
where ✓FC is the moisture content of the soil at Full Capacity (m3 m 3) and Zr is the
depth of the tree’s roots (m).
In absence of a source of water, the moisture in the soil will decrease due to the water
consumption of the tree. As this consumption increases, the moisture level will go down,
making it harder for the tree to absorb the remaining water. Eventually, a point will be
reached beyond which the tree can no longer absorb any water: the Permanent Wilting (PW)
point. The PW point is the moisture level of the soil at which the tree will permanently die.
In our case:
PW = 1000 · ✓PW · Zr,
where ✓WP is the moisture content of the soil at the Permanent Wilting point (m3 m 3)
and Zr is the depth of the tree’s roots (m).
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Moisture levels above FC cannot be sustained, given the eﬀect of gravity. Moisture levels
below PW cannot be extracted by the roots of the trees. Hence, the Total Available Water
(TAW) will be the diﬀerence between both:
TAW = FC   PW,
Zr = 4m in the case of apricot trees irrigated with traditional flooding methods. The
soil in Murcia is limestone, hence (✓FC   ✓PW ) 2 [0.13, 0.19] and ✓PW 2 [0.09, 0.21]. For our
estimation we take the middle point, i.e., FC = 1240, PW = 600 and TAW = 640.
In practice, the tree will absorb water from the soil at a slower rate, even before reaching
the PW point. When the tree is under HS, the tree is not absorbing water at the proper rate.
The fraction of water that the tree can absorb without suﬀering HS is the Easily Absorbed
Water (EAW):
EAW = pcTAW,
where pc 2 [0, 1]. For the case of the apricot tree pc = 0.5, thus EAW = 320. The Hydric
Stress coeﬃcient KS ⌘ KS (Mt) is a function of the moistness of the plot Mt:
KS (Mt) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 if Mt > FC   TAW (1  pc)
Mt PW
EAW if FC   TAW (1  pc)  Mt > PW
0 if Mt  PW
. (A.1)
Figure A6 shows the evolution of the coeﬃcient of hydric stress for apricot trees, according
to equation A.1. When the moisture level in the soil is below the PW point (600 mm), the
plant dies and there is no transpiration. When the moisture level is suﬃciently high (920
mm), the tree does not suﬀer from hydric stress and therefore the transpiration is maximal.
When the soil has enough moisture for the tree to survive (Mt > PW ), but not enough for
the tree to function normally (Mt < FC  TAW (1  pc)), the tree suﬀers from hydric stress.
Hydric stress makes the tree transpire less that it would otherwise.
Adding the subscripts for the periods we can write:
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Figure A6: Relation between the hydric stress coeﬃcient KS and the moisture level for
apricots.
Notes: This figure represents the relation between the hydric stress coeﬃcient, KS, and the level of moisture
in the soil, for apricot trees in southern Spain. The parameters are taken from Allen et al. (2006). The graph
is similar to Figure 42 in Allen et al. (2006).
ETc,adj,t (Mt) = KS (Mt) ·Kcb,t · ET0. (A.2)
Figure A7 shows the combined eﬀects of seasonality and hydric stress on the evapotran-
spiration coeﬃcient, following equation A.2.
Finally, we have to take into account that, regardless of the amount of rain or irrigation,
the moistness of the soil can never get beyond the FC. The evolution of the moisture Mt
over time is:
Mt = min {Mt 1 + raint 1 + irrigationt 1   ETc,adj,t 1 (Mt 1) , FC} .
We get an average value for ETc of 8.77, which is smaller than Franco et al. (2000) who
find values of 23.1-30.8 mm per week (3.3-4.3 mm per day) for almond trees in the same
region. Pérez-Pastor et al. (2009) report an Evapotranspiration of 1,476 mm per year (28.4
mm per week). This diﬀerence is due to the fact that recent studies are done using intensive
dripping irrigation. Because the level of moisture of the land is greater, so is the level of
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Figure A7: Relation between the hydric stress and seasonality, and the moisture level for
apricots
Notes: This figure represents the relation between the hydric stress coeﬃcient, KS, and seasonality, and the
level of moisture in the soil, for apricot trees in southern Spain. The parameters are taken from Allen et al.
(2006). The graph is a combination of Figures 37 and 42 in Allen et al (2006).
Evapotranspiration.
A.2.2 Details about the Apricot Production Function.
Following Torrecillas et al. (2000) we can specify the weeks of the year in which irrigation
is “critical” for apricot trees, as shown in Figure 1 in the paper. The critical weeks include
the second rapid fruit growth period (Stage III) and two months after the critical, i.e., Early
Post-Harvest (EPH). Both periods are located before and after the harvest season.
Stage III corresponds to the period of high growth before the critical season. This stage
is critical because it is the stage at which the trees “transform” water into fruit at the highest
rate. The EPH period is also important because of the stress that the trees suﬀer during
the summer after the critical season. Before and during the critical season the trees use the
water at a high rate. Hence, the levels of moisture in the trees are very low after the critical
season. In order for the trees to survive the summer, they need to be irrigated. Failure to do
so will result in a lower output during the next season (see Pérez-Pastor et al., 2009).
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Table A2: Demand for Water and Urban Real Estate.
# units bought (1) (2) (3) (4)
Wealthy 0.0255*** 0.0235*** 0.0133** 0.0126*
(0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0066)
(Wealthy) x 0.0702*** 0.0602***
x (Critical Season) (0.0117) (0.0122)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 14,448 14,448 14,448 14,448
Notes: All regressions are OLS specifications. The sample is restricted to farmers who only grow apricots. In
panel A, the dependent variable is the total number of units bought by each individual farmer during a given
week. In panel B, he dependent variable is the number of units bought by each individual farmer during a
given week per tree. “Wealthy” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the value of urban real estate of the
farmer is above the median, and 0 otherwise. “Critical season” is a dummy that equals 1 if the observation
belongs to a week during the critical season, and 0 otherwise. “Covariates” are the price paid by farmers in
the auction, the amount of rainfall during the week of the irrigation, the farmer’s soil moisture level, and the
farmer’s number of trees. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
A.3 Additional Preliminary Analysis.
Table A2 is similar to Table 2 in the paper, but uses the number of units bought per farmer
as the dependent variable instead of the number of units bought per farmer per tree for
robustness. As in Table 2 in the paper, Table A2 restricts attention to farmers who grow
only apricot trees and displays OLS regressions of the number of units bought by each farmer
in a given week on several covariates. The variable “wealthy” is a variable that equals 1 if the
value of the urban real estate owned by the farmer is greater than the sample median, and
0 otherwise. The idea behind this dummy variable is that wealthy, elite farmers are never
liquidity constrained. They do not have to pay rent for their houses, and they can collect
rent from their urban real estate to obtain cash during the critical season, financing their
purchases. Consider two farmers who grow apricots, who have the same number of trees, and
who are not liquidity constrained. Water demand is governed by the water need of the tree,
as determined by the apricot production function. These two farmers should have the same
demand for water up to an idiosyncratic shock. Therefore, the demand for water and the
monetary value of urban real estate should be uncorrelated for farmers who are not liquidity
constrained. As expected, Table A2 shows that wealthy farmers demand more water than
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Table A3: Demand for Water per tree and Urban Real Estate in dry and regular years.
Regular Years Dry Years
# units bought per tree (1) (2) (3) (4)
Wealthy 0.0138* 0.010139* -0.0016 -0.0125
(0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0087) (0.0092)
(Wealthy) 0.0209 0.0630***
⇥ (Critical season) (0.0107) (0.0183)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 8,736 8,736 4,992 4,992
Notes: All regressions are OLS specifications. The sample is restricted to farmers who only grow apricots.
Dry years are defined to be the four driest harvest years in the sample, i.e., lowest rain from week 25 in the
previous calendar year to week 24 in the current calendar year. Dry years are: 1960, 1962, 1964 and 1966.
The remaining years are regular years. The dependent variable is the number of units bought per tree by
each individual farmer during a given week. “Wealthy” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the value of
urban real estate of the farmer is above the median and 0 otherwise. “Critical season” is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the observation belongs to a week during the critical season and 0 otherwise. “Covariates”
are the price paid by farmers in the auction, the amount of rainfall during the week of the irrigation, and the
farmer’s soil moisture level. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
non-wealthy farmers throughout the year because they own larger plots than non-wealthy
farmers. More importantly, and consistently with Table 2 in the paper, wealthy farmers also
demand more water during the critical season because they are never liquidity constrained.
Table A3 shows that the behavior of poor and wealthy farmers during the critical season
is similar in regular years (i.e. years without droughts). We expect poor farmers to be less
likely to be liquidity constrained during regular years, when the price of water in the auction
does not increase substantially. The rainfall during the harvest year (i.e., from week 25 in
the previous calendar year until week 24 in the present calendar year) is an exogenous shock
that shifts both the demand for water and the water prices down. Table A3 shows that the
purchase decisions of the wealthy and poor farmers are diﬀerent for dry and regular years.
In Table 2 column 4 in the paper, the interaction between wealth and the critical season
is 0.0315. This is a weighted average between 0.0209, in regular years, and 0.0630, in dry
years. This interaction is smaller and insignificant in regular years. This result indicates that
diﬀerent purchase behavior during the critical season comes from the dry years, when both
the demand for water and the prices of water in the critical season are high. In other words,
the purchase behavior of poor and wealthy farmers is similar during regular years, when poor
farmers are less likely to be liquidity constrained.
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B Welfare Comparison of Markets vs. Quotas
In Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2016) we present a two period model, where some agents face
liquidity constraints (LC) and their preferences are characterized by storability and season-
ality. Agents diﬀer in two unobserved dimensions, their valuation of water (productivity)
and the amount of cash they have to pay for water (wealth). This is the simplest model that
can accommodate the main elements analyzed in this paper: heterogeneity in productivity,
liquidity constraints, storability, and seasonality. Productivity during the first period (oﬀ
season) is lower for all farmers than during the second period (critical season). The model
is useful to understand both positive and normative questions. The results regarding the
dynamics of purchases, the ineﬃciency of the market equilibrium, and the relative eﬃciency
of market vs. quotas apply directly to the general infinity-horizon model. The notion of first-
best eﬃciency does not translate into the general model. When farmers are heterogeneous
in productivity and the horizon is infinite, the notion of first-best is cumbersome because it
has to accommodate all possible future combinations of allocations.
Market Equilibrium.
The model predicts that, as long as LC are binding (i.e. some farmers do not have enough
cash to pay for the water in a given period), then the timing of purchases matters. Poor
farmers will not be able to buy water in the second period, when water is more valuable.
Wealthy farmers will buy all the water in the second period and some of the water in the first
period. If LC are severe (i.e. some farmers do not have enough cash to pay for water in any
period), poor farmers will not buy water in any period, and some wealthy farmers will buy
several units of water. The above results imply that as long as LC are binding, poor farmers
will not be able to buy water during the critical season. The model also predicts that farmers
with intermediate wealth (LC are binding but not severe) will buy more water than wealthy
farmers oﬀ season, while farmer with severe LC will buy less water than the wealthy farmer
oﬀ season. When LC are binding, prices could be at their unconstrained level or could both
be lower than their unconstrained level. When LC are severe, prices will always be lower
than their unconstrained levels.
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Market Eﬃciency.
There are two sources of market ineﬃciency. If LC are binding and farmers are homogeneous
in productivity, this will not reduce welfare. As long as all units of water are allocated and
no farmer buys more than two units (while others get zero units) the allocation would be
eﬃcient. If farmers are heterogeneous in productivity, eﬃciency requires assortative matching
between units of water and farmers. In other words, eﬃciency requires that farmers with
high productivity buy water in the second period (and never end up not buying water) and
farmers with low productivity buy water in the first period (and some do not buy any water).
If LC are binding, farmers with high productivity and low wealth might not be able to buy
water in the second period when it is more productive. This is the first source of market
ineﬃciency: ineﬃciency in the intensive margin or mismatching. Mismatching will happen
only when there are diﬀerences in productivity among farmers and it will be important when
those diﬀerences are large.2
There could still be market ineﬃciency even if there are no diﬀerences in productivity
among farmers. If LC are severe, then the market allocation will be ineﬃcient even if farmers
are homogeneous in productivity. If LC are severe, poor farmers will not be able to buy water
in any period and some wealthy farmers will buy more than one unit of water. Since the
production function is concave in unit of water bought, the gains from the second unit of
water of a wealthy farmer are less valuable that the gains from the first unit of water of a
poor farmer. This is the second source of market ineﬃciency: ineﬃciency in the extensive
margin or overallocation. Overallocation will happen only when LC are severe.
Welfare: Market vs. Quotas.
The results above describe the conditions under which the market will be ineﬃcient. However,
they do not compare the relative eﬃciency of the market mechanism vs. the quota mechanism
when both are ineﬃcient, i.e., when neither achieves the first-best allocation.
2If diﬀerences in productivity are large compared to the concavity of the production function in units of
water bought, then the gains from the second unit of water of a high productivity farmer could be greater
than the gains from the first unit of water of a low productivity farmer. If there is perfect correlation between
wealth and productivity, and diﬀerences in productivity are large compared to the concavity of the production
function, then the market is eﬃcient.
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Both the quotas and the market could achieve the first-best allocation under some condi-
tions. When farmers are heterogeneous in productivity but LC are not binding, then markets
are eﬃcient but the quotas are not. When LC are not binding, then the model is similar to
the standard neoclassical model, and markets achieve eﬃciency by allocating more valuable
units to those who value them more. Quotas allocate the units uniformly. Because units are
discrete here, uniformly means randomly. This means that farmers with high productivity
and farmers with low productivity have the same probability of receiving one unit in each
period. Quotas will produce mismatching by allocating units during the critical season to
farmers with low productivity; however all units will be allocated and no farmer will get more
than one unit, thus quotas will never produce overallocation of units.
When farmers are homogeneous in productivity, but LC are severe, then the quotas are
eﬃcient but the markets are not. When farmers are homogeneous in productivity there is
only one potential source of ineﬃciency: overallocation. Since all farmers have the same
valuation for each unit, matching is irrelevant. Any mechanism that allocates all the units
and at most one unit to each farmer will be eﬃcient. However, the markets will not pass
this test when LC are severe. The markets will allocate all the units to wealthy farmers and
no units to poor farmers. Some wealthy farmers will receive two units overallocation and
some high productivity poor farmers will not receive any unit in the critical season, thus
generating mismatching.
In the intermediate case, when farmers are heterogeneous in productivity and LC are
binding, the relative eﬃciency of markets and quotas is ambiguous. Both mechanisms suﬀer
frommismatching but neither suﬀer from overallocation. Both mechanisms assign units in the
critical season to farmers with low productivity and some high productivity farmers do not
receive any units. In general, quotas are more eﬃcient than markets when the heterogeneity
in wealth is relatively large and the heterogeneity in productivity is relatively small, while
markets are more eﬃcient than quotas when the heterogeneity in wealth is relatively small
and the heterogeneity in productivity is relatively large.
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C Details about the Estimation Procedure and the Struc-
tural Model
C.1 Demand Estimates.
We construct a two-step conditional choice probability (CCP) estimator to estimate the
parameters that characterize demand (Hotz and Miller 1993; Hotz et al. 1994).
Step 1. In the first step we compute transition probability matrices for the following ob-
servable state variables: moisture, week, price, and rain. As described in the paper, the
productivity shocks, "ijt, are assumed to be i.i.d. Gumbel, so they can be integrated ana-
lytically (see Subsection C.3). Moisture is a continuous variable and its evolution over time
depends on both the farmers’ decisions to buy water and rainfall. Therefore, certain values
of moisture are never reached in the sample, even when their probability of occurrence is
nonzero. To estimate demand, however, we need to integrate the value function for each
possible combination of the state variables in the state space. Thus, we first estimate the
CCP using the values (of the state space) reached in the sample. Then we use the CCP
estimator to predict the CCP on the values (of the state space) unreached in the sample.
We estimate the CCP both parametrically (using a logistic distribution) and nonpara-
metrically (using kernel methods to smooth both discrete and continuous variables). There
are four observable state variables in the structural model when the liquidity constraint is
not binding (i.e. for the wealthy farmers): moisture, week of the year, price of water, and
rain. Moisture is a deterministic continuous variable that represents the amount of water
accumulated in the farmers’ plot; it goes from 300 to 1200. Week of the year is a deterministic
discrete variable; it goes from 1 to 52. Price of water and rain are random variables. As ex-
plained in the paper, we assume that, holding fixed the week of the year, farmers jointly draw
a price-rain pair, (pt, rt), among the 12 pairs (i.e. the 12 years of the same week) available in
the data with equal probability (see Subsection C.4 for details). Each week, prices may take
three discrete values: low, high, or no-auction. Each week, rain may take two discrete values:
no rain (i.e. zero mm, which is the median of the rain distribution) or positive rain (in this
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case, we assign the median of the rain distribution, conditional on rain being positive, that
is 31mm). For each week, low price is the mean price below the median of the same week
across years; high price is the mean price above the median of the same week across years.
We estimate the joint distribution of prices and rain non-parametrically using a frequency
estimator. To estimate the CCP we use the actual realizations from the data of price and
rainfall.
We estimate the CCP parametrically using a logistic model (i.e. multinomial logit). Let
Sit = (Mit, wt, pt, rt) ✏ R4 be the vector of state variables, where Mit is the moisture of the
soil of farmer i in week t, wt is the week of year, pt is the price of water in the auction in
week t, and rt is the rainfall in week t. Let jikt = 1 if farmer i bought k units in period t
and 0 otherwise. We estimate the CCP by maximizing the following log-likelihood function
lnL =
PT
t=1
PI
i=1
PJ
k=0 jiktlnPikt, where Pikt =
⇣
exp(0Sit)P
j exp(
0Sit)
⌘
and  is the parameter vector.
We also estimate CCP nonparametrically. Rather than using a traditional frequency-
based approach in the presence of discrete variables, to compute the CCP we smooth both
discrete and continuous variables. There are two reasons for this. First, it allows us to
extend the reach of the nonparametric methods to our empirical model. It is well known
that nonparametric frequency methods are useful only when the sample size is large and the
discrete variables take a limited number of values: this allows the number of discrete cells to
be smaller than the sample size.3 Second, moisture is a continuous variable and its evolution
over time depends on both the decisions to buy water of the farmers and the realizations
of rain. Therefore, certain values of moisture are never reached in the sample even when
their probability of occurrence is not zero.4 To estimate the demand, however, we need to
integrate the value function over the relevant combination of the state variables associated
with the nodes of some simulated future path of the farmer.5 Thus, we estimate the CCP
3The frequency approach is not feasible in our setting, even if we discretize the continuous variable moisture
in a reasonable number of values. See Subsection C.8 for a thorough discussion.
4For example, for week 23 the joint probability of no rain and low price conditional on this week is 9.1%.
This is because only in 1 out of 11 years was registered low rain and low price in the week 23 (1/11 = .0909).
The observed diﬀerent values of inventories for the 12 unconstrained farmers are (at most) 12 ⇥ 1 = 12. In
the simulation, however, a value of moisture diﬀerent from, although close to, these 12 observed values may
be reached. But the frequency estimator would not be defined for any value of moisture diﬀerent from those
12 values.
5That is, we also need to integrate over values of moisture discussed in previous footnote where the
frequency estimator is not defined. These values of moisture are never reached in our sample.
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nonparametrically using kernel methods to smooth both discrete and continuous variables.
We define now the nonparametric CCP estimator. Following Li and Racine (2003) we
use generalized product kernels for a mix of continuous and discrete variables. Let Sit = 
Mit, Sdt
 
✏ R⇥ R3 be the vector of state variables, where Mit✏ R is again moisture and
Sdt = (wt, pt, rt) ✏ R3 is the vector of discrete state variables: week, price, and rain. Let
sdk be the kth component of sd and Sdt = (t = 1, . . . , T ). For Sdtk, sdk ✏ {0, 1 . . . , ck   1} (the
support of each discrete variable) define the univariate kernel (Aitchison and Aitken, 1976):
lu
 
Sdtk, s
d
k, k
 
=
8>><>>:
1   k if Sdtk = sdk
 k
ck 1 if S
d
tk 6= sdk
.
We use the above kernel for prices and rain. For the ordered discrete variable week we
use the kernel function (Wang and van Ryzin, 1981) lo (wt, v, 1) =  |w v|1 , where  1✏ [0, 1].
Therefore, for the multivariate vector of discrete state variables we use the product kernel:
L
 
Sdit, s
d, 
 
= lo (wt, v, 1)
3Y
k=2
lu
 
Sdtk, s
d
k, k
 
=  |w v|1
3Y
k=2
✓
 k
ck   1
◆Ntk(s)
(1   k)1 Ntk(s) ,
(C.1)
where   = ( 2, 3) and Ntk (s) = 1
 
Sdtk 6= sdk
 
is an indicator function that equals 1 if Sdtk 6= sdk
and 0 otherwise. Let f (s) = f
 
m, sd
 
be the joint probability density function (PDF) of
Sit =
 
Mit, Sdt
 
. We use the following kernel estimator fˆ (s) = 1T
PT
t=1 LtsdWh,tM , where
Wh,tM = h 1w
 
Mt m
h
 
, w (·) is a standard univariate second order Gaussian kernel, and
Ltsd = L
 
Sdt , s
d, 
 
is given by equation C.1. We select bandwidth using likelihood cross-
validation. We estimate the fˆ (s) using the observed values of the variables in the state space
(in the sample). We then use the estimated density and evaluate it at the unobserved values
of the state space needed to integrate the value function (out of the sample).
We extrapolate CCP on unobserved states using the estimated PDF from the sample.
These are the smooth CCP.
Step 2. We restrict the sample to the twelve farmers that are not liquidity constrained. We
estimate the vector of structural parameters, ⇥ ⌘ ( ,  ", ⇣), of the model in Section 4 using
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the conditional choice simulation estimator proposed by Hotz et al. (1994) which is based on
the inversion theorem by Hotz and Miller (1993). We integrate the value function using the
smoothed CCP as computed in the previous subsection. We set the discount factor   equal
to 0.99. Prices and rain are simulated using the joint distribution of prices and rain estimated
with the procedure described in the second paragraph of step 1. We normalize the number of
trees of the farmers using the median number of apricot trees for the unconstrained farmers,
76 trees. We let moisture follow the evolution described by equations in Appendix A.2 with
the following values: TAW = 1200, PW = 300, EAW = 0.5 · TAW , E = 4 (see A.2 for
details). The observed number of units that farmers buy varies from 0 to 4 units per week.
For the initial condition of the moisture we follow Hendel and Nevo (2006, p. 1,647), and
use the estimated distribution of moisture to generate its initial distribution. We do this by
starting at an arbitrary initial level of moisture of: 1/2⇥ (TAW+PW), where TAW and PW
are the Total Available Water and Permanent Welting Point described above (see Appendix
A.2 for details). In practice, in our application the initial condition of the moisture has no
impact on its evolution after a couple of weeks due to the evotranspiration rate and rainfall.
We have experimented with diﬀerent initial conditions and obtained almost identical results.
We estimate the parameter vector ⇥ using a GMM estimator based on moment conditions
proposed by Hotz et al. We use 200 simulations, each with 12 individuals, and T = 572 weeks
per individual per simulation. That is, for each simulation and each individual, we use a total
of T = 11 years⇥ 52weeks periods, which is the length of our panel, leaving a total of 6, 864
observations in each simulation. We perform the estimation using KNITRO, a solver for non-
linear optimization, with tolerance level of 1.0e-12. With the estimated demand we recover
the annual revenue for all farmers, constrained and unconstrained.
C.2 Properties of the Demand Estimator.
Following Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) we now establish some properties of the demand
estimator. Time is discrete and indexed by t. Each period represents a week. We index
farmers by i. Farmers have preferences defined over a sequence of states from period t = 0
until period t = 1. The state at period t for wealthy farmer i has two components, a
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vector of state variables sit = (Mit, wt, pt, rt, ✏it) that is known at period t; and a decision
vector jit chosen at period t that belongs to the discrete set J 2 {0, ..., J}. The vector
of state variables, sit, also includes the error vector ✏it ⌘ (✏i1t, ..., ✏iJt). The time index, t,
can be a component of the state vector, sit, which may also contain time-invariant indi-
vidual characteristics. Farmer’s preferences over possible sequences of states is represented
by a utility function
P1
⌧=0  
⌧U (ji,t+⌧ , si,t+⌧ ), where   2 (0, 1) is the discount factor and
U (jit, sit) = h (jit,Mit, wt;  ) + ✏ijt   ⇣j   jitpt is the current utility function. The decision
at period t aﬀects the evolution of future values of the state variables, and the farmer faces
uncertainty about these future values. Liquidity constraints are never binding for wealthy
farmers. Also note that the welting point constraint aﬀects only the utility function as defined
above, but not the choice set. The farmer’s beliefs about future states can be represented by
a Markov transition distribution function, F (si,t+1|jit, sit). These beliefs are rational in that
they are the true transition probabilities of the state variables. Every period t the farmer
observes the vector of state variables, sit, and chooses an action jit 2 J to maximize the
expected utility:
E
 1X
⌧=0
 ⌧U (ji,t+⌧ , si,t+⌧ ) |jit, si,t
!
.
This is the farmer’s dynamic programming (DP) problem. Let ↵ (si,t) and V (si,t) be the
optimal decision rule and the value function of the DP problem, respectively. By Bellman’s
principle of optimality the value function can be obtained using the recursive expression:
V (sit) = max
j2J
⇢
h (jit,Mit, wt;  ) + ✏jt   ⇣j   jitpt +  
Z
V (si,t+1) dF (si,t+1|j, sit)
 
,
and the optimal decision rule is then ↵ (si,t) = argmax
j2J
{v¯ (j, si,t)} where, for every j 2 J ,
v¯ (j, si,t) ⌘ h (jit,Mit, wt;  ) + ✏jt   ⇣j   jitpt +  
Z
V (si,t+1) dF (si,t+1|j, sit) .
We are interested in the estimation of the structural parameters in preferences and tran-
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sition probabilities. Suppose that a researcher has a panel of N individuals who behave
according to this decision model. For every observation, (i, t), in this panel, the researcher
observes the individual’s action, jit, and a subvector, (Mit, wt, pt, rt), of the state vector, sit.
In summary, the researcher’s data set is:
Data = {jit,Mit, wt, pt, rt : i = 1, 2, ..., N ; t = 1, 2, ...,1} .
We now discuss the assumptions regarding the relationship between observable and un-
observable variables following Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010).
Assumption AS (Additive Separability). The utility function is additively separa-
ble in the observable and unobservable components: U (jit, sit) ⌘ U (jit,Mit, wt, pt, rt, ✏it) =
h (jit,Mit, wt;  )+✏ijt ⇣j jitpt, where ✏ijt is a real random variable with unbounded support.
Assumption IID (i.i.d. Unobservables). The unobserved state variables in ✏it are
independently and identically distributed over agents and over time with cumulative den-
sity function (CDF) G" (✏it), which has finite first moments and is continuous and twice
diﬀerentiable in ✏it.
Assumption CI-X (Conditional Independence of Future x). Conditional on the
current values of the decision and the observable state variables, next period observable
state variables do not depend on current ✏it. This assumption holds trivially for wt. It also
holds trivially for xit, because the covariates are constant for a given individual, for calendar
eﬀects, and also rain, which is exogenous. This assumption also holds for prices as discussed
in Section 3 in the paper. Finally, the law of motion of the moisture is independent of ✏it.
Assumption CLOGIT. The unobserved state variables ✏ijt are independent and have
an extreme value type 1 distribution.
Assumption DIS (Discrete Support of x). The support of (Mit, wt, pt, rt) is discrete
and finite: (Mit, wt, pt, rt) 2 X =
 
x(1), ..., x(|X|)
 
with |X| <1.
This model satisfies the assumptions in Hotz and Miller (1993) and Hotz et al. (1994),
thus establishing the legitimacy of our simulation-based CCP estimator described in Section
4 in the paper.
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C.3 Specification of the Productivity Shock.
We introduce the notation with the specification in Subsection C.3.1 for the case of i.i.d.
shocks across choice alternatives, where the result below is well known in the industrial
organization literature. In Subsection C.3.2 we extend these results to the case of shocks
non i.i.d. across choice alternatives, which is the main specification used in the paper. For
robustness, we also present the demand estimates using the specification in Subsection C.3.1.
Estimation results of the structural model using both specifications are in Subsection C.5 in
this appendix.
C.3.1 Specification with i.i.d. shocks across choice alternatives.
Under this specification the productivity shocks, "ijt, are drawn i.i.d. across choice alter-
natives j 2 {0, 1, . . . , J}, where each choice alternative involves the purchase of a diﬀerent
number of units, and across individuals and over time. Let the value function be:
V (Mit, wt, pt, rt, µit, ✏ijt) ⌘ max
jit2{0,1,...,J}
{h (jit,Mit, wt;  ) + "ijt   ⇣j   ptjit+
+  E [V (Mi,t+1, µi,t+1, wt+1, pt+1, rt+1, ✏i,j,t+1) |Mit, wt, pt, rt, µit, jit]}
s.t.: Mit   PW
s.t. : jitpt  µit, 8jit > 0
,
Rewrite it as (we omit the constraints in what follows):
V (Xit, ✏ijt) ⌘ max
jit2{0,1,...,J}
{H (⇧) + "ijt +  E" [V (Xit+1, ✏ijt+1)FXdX |Xit, jit]} ,
where Xit ⌘ (Mit, wt, pt, rt), H (⇧) ⌘ h (jit,Mit, wt;  )  ptjit   ⇣j.
Now rewrite the previous expression as:
V (Xit, ✏ijt) ⌘ max
jit2{0,1,...,J}
{v(jit, Xit) + "ijt} ,
where v(jit, Xit) is the choice specific value function.
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Then if the productivity shocks "ijt follow a Gumbel distribution with CDF F" ("it;  ") =
e e 
"it/ " :
E"V (Xit+1, ✏ijt+1) =
Z
"
max
jit2{0,1,...,J}
{v(jit, Xit) + "ijt} dF" = log
 
JX
j=0
exp (v(jit, Xit))
!
+  ¯ ",
(C.2)
where the last equality follows from the properties of the Gumbel distribution and  ¯ = 0.5772
is the Euler’s constant.
Then:
P (jit = d) = P ("idt   "ikt > v(jit = k,Xit)  v(jit = d,Xit), 8k 6= d) .
Using the properties of the Gumbel distribution:
P (jit = d) =
exp
 
vd
 PJ
k=0 exp (v
k)
, (C.3)
where vr ⌘ v(jit = r,Xit).
Then replacing the equation in (C.3) into (C.2):
E"V (Xit+1, ✏ijt+1) = vd   log (P (jit = d)) +  ¯ ".
C.3.2 Specification with shocks non i.i.d. across choice alternatives.
We follow the same steps as in Subsection C.3.1. Now jˆ 2 {0, 1}, where jˆ = 0 if j = 0 and
jˆ = 1 if j > 0. Then the productivity shocks, "ijˆt, are drawn i.i.d. across jˆ 2 {0, 1} and the
shock is the same for every unit, so "ijt = "ijˆt for j = 0 and "ijt = "ijˆt for j > 0. Let the
value function be:
V
⇣
Xit, ✏ijˆt
⌘
⌘ max
jit2{0,1,...,J}
n
h (jit,Mit, wt;  ) + "i,jˆ=0,t1 {jit = 0}+ "i,jˆ=1,t1 {jit > 0}  ⇣j   ptjit+
+  E
h
V
⇣
Xit+1, ✏i,jˆ,t+1
⌘
|Xit, jit
io
.
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Rewrite the previous expression as:6
V
 
Xit, ✏ijˆt
  ⌘ max(v(jit = 0, Xit) + "i,jˆ=0,t, max
j+it2{1,...,J}
 
v(jit = j
+
it , Xit) + "i,jˆ=1,t
 )
.
Using the properties of the Gumbel distribution:
E"V
 
Xit+1, ✏ijˆt+1
 
= log
⇣
exp
 
v0
 
+ exp
⇣
vj
+
⌘⌘
+  ¯ ", (C.4)
and:
P (jit = 0) =
exp (v0)
exp (v0) + exp (vj+)
, (C.5)
P
 
jit = j
+
it
 
=
exp
⇣
vj
+
⌘
exp (v0) + exp (vj+)
. (C.6)
Replacing the equations in (C.5) and (C.6) into (C.4) we obtain a the closed-form solution
for:
E"V
 
Xit+1, ✏ijˆt+1
 
.
C.4 Serial Correlation Over Time in Rainfall and Auction Water
Price.
In this subsection we discuss our modeling assumption for the evolution of the state variables
for auction water price and rainfall, and their fit to the data. In particular, we discuss the
role of serial correlation over time in rainfall and the price of water.
We model the evolution of prices and rainfall to capture two main empirical regularities
from our setting. First, the major determinant of the price of water is weather seasonality.
Second, the variation of prices and rainfall across years is low, conditional on the week of
6Note that the inner maximization process is deterministic. That is, conditional on buying, there is only
one shock. Therefore, no integration is needed for the inner maximization process.
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the year (which captures seasonality).7 Our data in this paper span 12 years. We model the
joint evolution of the price of water in period t, that denotes a week, and rainfall in period
t 1 assuming that, holding fixed the week of the year, farmers jointly draw a price-rain pair,
(pt, rt 1), i.i.d. among the 12 pairs (i.e. the 12 years of the same week) available in the data
with equal probability.
Serial correlation in the price of water arises because weather seasonality is its main deter-
minant, and dry weather in a given week is usually followed by dry weather in a subsequent
week. During summers, for example, prices are systematically higher for several weeks. In-
deed, in the tables described below we find that the price of water displays serial correlation
across the weeks of the year. Accounting for such serial correlation is important because it
aﬀects the dynamics of prices ,and farmers’ decisions, if such dynamics are taken into account
when the farmers bid in the auction.
One potential concern with our specification for the evolution of price and rainfall is that
it may not account for the serial correlation in prices. We investigate this concern in Tables
A4 and A5, that display OLS regressions using the price of water from the data and the price
of water simulated for the structural model as dependent variables, along with two tests for
the disturbance from these regressions: (1) a Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation, and
(2) a Durbin’s alternative test for serial correlation.8
Table A4 shows that under our specification for the evolution of prices, as described
above, the predicted prices closely follow the prices in the data, and that the residual part
of the price of water from the data that is not explained by the simulated price displays
no serial correlation. Column 1 shows that, as expected, the Breusch-Godfrey and Durbin’s
alternative tests strongly reject the null of no first-order serial correlation in the disturbance
of a regression of price of water on a constant. Column 2 shows the regression of the price of
water from the data on the simulated price of water using the specification described in the
first paragraph, which corresponds to the one used for the structural model in Section 3 in the
paper. As expected, the simulated price tracks the price from the data quite well as indicated
by an estimated coeﬃcient of 0.71, which is statistically significant, and a goodness of the fit
7See Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2018) for details.
8For details about these tests see, e.g., Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).
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of R2 = 47 percent. Importantly, the tests for the disturbance in this regression show that
we cannot reject the null hypotheses of no first-order serial correlation (the p-value of the
Breusch-Godfrey test is 32.9 percent and the p-value of the Durbin’s alternative test is 33.3
percent).9 That is, the residual part of the price of water from the data that is not explained
by the simulated price displays no serial correlation. This indicates that the specification
used to simulate the price of water for the structural model accounts for the serial correlation
in the price of water from the data. Intuitively, this occurs because our specification models
price and rainfall as a joint distribution conditional on the week of the year, using the price
of water from the current week and the rainfall from the previous week, (pt, rt 1). The main
determinants of the price of water in a given week are the rainfall from the previous week,
and the calendar week. As shown in A4, these two variables are suﬃcient to account for the
serial correlation observed in the data. Column 3 performs a similar analysis as column 1,
but using the price of water simulated for the structural model. Similar to column 1, column
3 shows that for the simulated prices we also reject the null of no first-order serial correlation
in the disturbance. This shows that the simulated price for the structural model displays
serial correlation similar to that in the price of water in the data.
Table A5 focuses on the alternative modeling assumptions for the evolution of the state
variables for price of water and rainfall. For example, an alternative assumption commonly
used in the industrial organization literature is to use a Markov process with lagged price of
water, or rainfall, or both (recall that rainfall corresponds to the rain during the previous
week). Column 1 displays a regression of price of water on the lagged price of water, and
shows that we cannot reject the null of no serial correlation in the disturbance from such
regression. Columns 2 and 3 show similar results when we include lagged rainfall, or both,
lagged price of water and lagged rainfall: the null of no serial correlation cannot be rejected.
Columns 4 to 6, repeat the analysis in the previous columns including week fixed eﬀects, a
set of 51 dummy variables each corresponding to one week of the year. Again, the null of
no serial correlation cannot be rejected.10 We interpret this as evidence that using a Markov
process with either lagged price of water, or lagged rainfall, or both as an alternative modeling
9Similar results are obtained if one additionally includes the simulated rain as dependent variable, and/or
if one includes additional lags.
10Similar results are obtained using additional lags for the price of water and rainfall.
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assumption does not account for the serial correlation in the prices from the data.
We conclude this subsection comparing the correlation patterns between price of water and
rainfall from the data, and the simulation of these variables using the specification from the
structural model. Table A6 displays these correlations. The first column, labeled as “Data,”
shows that there is a negative correlation between price of water in week t and rainfall in
previous week(s), as expected. The correlation tends to decrease with higher lags because the
eﬀect of rain on demand dissipates as times passes due to the evapotranspiration of water.
Again, this negative correlation is the main reason why the price of water displays serial
correlation across weeks of the year. It is also the main reason why we use the conditional
joint process described above to model price of water and rainfall. The second column, labeled
as “Simulation,” shows the same patterns from the simulated variables (price of water and
rainfall) used in the structural model. The correlation patterns from the simulated variables
are similar to the ones from the data.
Table A4: Price regressions and tests for serial correlation in the disturbance using specifi-
cation from the structural model
(1) (2) (3)
Price data Price data Price simulated
Price simulated 0.7060***
(0.0681)
Constant 310.2234*** 103.0802*** 304.5125***
(20.0981) (32.3308) (18.5680)
R2 0.000 0.473 0.000
Breusch-Godfrey test
 2 statistic: 33.21 0.952 10.03
Prob. >  2: 8.27e-09 0.329 0.00154
Durbin’s alternative test
 2 statistic: 38.22 0.936 10.38
Prob. >  2: 6.31e-10 0.333 0.00127
Notes: The table displays OLS regressions using the variable displayed in each column as dependent variable. “Price data” is the price of water
from the data. “Price simulated” is the price of water that was simulated for the structural model as described in Section 3 in the paper, using the
procedure described in this subsection. All regresions include a constant that is reported in the table, and are performed with the sample used in
the structural model from Section 3, when the auction was run. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The bottom part of the table displays two tests
for the disturbance from the regressions in each column: (1) a Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation in the disturbance, and (2) a Durbin’s
alternative test for serial correlation in the disturbances. For each test and for each column, the table displays the value of the  2 statistic of the
test and the corresponding p-value, denoted by “Prob.> 2.” *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5: Price regressions and tests for serial correlation in the disturbance using alternative
specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price data Price data Price data Price data Price data Price data
Lagged price data 0.5496*** 0.5426*** 0.4978*** 0.5002***
(0.0699) (0.0695) (0.0924) (0.0923)
Rain data -3.9101** -2.3622* -1.5531 -1.5063
(1.7812) (1.2845) (1.2561) (1.2961)
Constant 106.6150*** 328.9105*** 122.6566*** 61.4336 132.7750* 61.2521
(22.4892) (21.6805) (23.9456) (156.0353) (79.5221) (155.7288)
Week fixed eﬀects No No No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.306 0.020 0.323 0.703 0.694 0.708
Breusch-Godfrey test
 2 statistic: chi2 27 30.45 25.99 29.54 56.79 31.16
Prob. >  2: 2.03e-07 3.42e-08 3.42e-07 5.48e-08 0 2.38e-08
Durbin’s alternative test
 2 statistic: chi2 32.64 34.44 30.92 23.12 57.66 24.45
Prob. >  2: 1.11e-08 4.39e-09 2.68e-08 1.53e-06 0 7.61e-07
Notes: The table displays OLS regressions using the variable “Price data” as dependent variable, which is the price of water from the data. The
variable “Lagged price data” is the lag of “price data.” The variable “Rain data” is the rain from the data. All regresions include a constant that is
reported in the table, and are performed with the sample used in the structural model from Section 3, when the auction was run. Standard errors
are in parenthesis. The bottom part of the table displays two tests for the disturbance from the regressions in each column: (1) a Breusch-Godfrey
test for serial correlation in the disturbance, and (2) a Durbin’s alternative test for serial correlation in the disturbance. For each test and for each
column, the table displays the value of the  2 statistic of the test and the corresponding p-value, denoted by “Prob.> 2.” *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table A6: Correlation between Price and Rain: Data and Simulation.
Data Simulation
Pricet Pricet
Pricet 1.000 Pricet 1.000
Raint -0.152 Raint -0.141
Raint 1 -0.101 Raint 1 -0.105
Raint 2 -0.074 Raint 2 -0.058
Raint 3 -0.116 Raint 3 -0.126
Raint 4 -0.093 Raint 4 -0.112
Raint 5 -0.061 Raint 5 -0.083
Raint 6 -0.071 Raint 6 -0.030
Notes: The table displays the correlation between the price of water in week t, denoted by Pricet, and rain in period tˆ, denoted
by Raintˆ, for tˆ = t, t   1, . . . , t   6. The column labeled as “Data,” displays these correlations using the data (with the same
sample as the one used in the structural model from Section 3, when the auction was run). The column labeled as “Simulation,”
displays these correlations using the simulated prices and rainfall used in the structural model, as described in Section 3 in the
paper.
C.5 Demand Estimates: Estimates of Additional Specifications of
the Model.
For robustness, we also present the demand estimates using the specification in Subsection
C.3.1. Table A7 displays the demand estimates using the specifications in Subsections C.3.1
and C.3.2, the latter being the same as the one presented in the paper in Section 5, which is
our preferred specification.
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Table A7: Structural Estimates
Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Transformation rate
(18  week  32):
  Linear term:  ˆL 0.1584 0.1790 0.2124 0.0734 0.1449 0.1804 0.2040 0.10494(0.0067) (0.0094) (0.0026) (0.0064) (0.0051) (0.0099) (0.0183) (0.0057)
  Quadratic term:  ˆQ   1.36e-04   6.19e-05   1.36e-04   1.53e-04(1.59e-05) (8.82e-06) (1.57e-05) (8.41e-06)
Irrigating cost: ⇣ˆ 24.3755 182.174 78.8924 34.3495 11.3193 183.5007 69.6141 201.8714(6.9848) (13.2357) (3.1994) (6.76245) (5.4146) (2.2251) (8.6176) (8.1738)
Scale parameter of 1.0100 1.0854 0.9361 1.0144 1.0252 1.0321 0.9923 1.1987
Gumbel distribution:  ˆ (0.2568) (0.1286) (0.0393) (0.1048) (0.0116) (0.0601) (0.0786) (0.0612)
Area heterogeneity No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Specification of the choice C.3.2 C.3.2 C.3.2 C.3.2 C.3.1 C.3.1 C.3.1 C.3.1
specific error term
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. See Subsection 6.1 for details about this table.
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C.6 Probability of Being Liquidity Constrained.
In this subsection we discuss how we estimate a lower bound on the probability of being
liquidity constrained for the poor farmers during the critical season. The demand estimates
(Sections 4 and 5 in the paper) and welfare analysis (Section 6 in the paper) are unaﬀected by
the estimates in this subsection. The estimates in this subsection provide additional evidence
about the presence of the liquidity constraints. They complement the evidence in Table A2.
In the data we only observe whether a poor farmer buys water or not, in addition to
the number of units they purchase. When a farmer does not buy water, we do not know
whether it is because the farmer does not demand water at the equilibrium price and is not
liquidity constrained, or whether the farmer is liquidity constrained. That is, for the poor
farmers the decision variable is censored. We compute a lower bound on the probability that
a poor farmer is liquidity constrained during the critical season using the demand estimates
from Section 4, and assuming that the CCPs of the poor and wealthy farmers would coincide
during the critical season if the poor farmers were not liquidity constrained. We provide
evidence about the latter behavior in Table A.3 in Appendix A.3. The intuition is that
farmers are heterogeneous in two dimensions, their productivity and their ability to pay for
the water or cash holdings. However, during the critical season, the purchase decisions are
determined by the production function of apricots. So the purchase behavior of a potentially
constrained farmer who is in the unconstrained state is the same as the purchase behavior
of a permanently unconstrained farmer. The “exclusion restriction” for the analysis in this
subsection is that poor and wealthy farmers have the same production function (i.e. no
persistent unobserved heterogeneity). See Subsection C.6 for details.11
The cash of farmer i in period t, denoted by µit, evolves according to:
µit = µi,t 1   pt 1ji,t 1 +  t (rei; ) + ⌘it + ⌫it, (C.7)
11This subsection provides a simple procedure to obtain approximate estimates (i.e. lower bounds), on the
probability of being liquidity constrained for the poor farmers. In Appendix C.8 we discuss two alternatives
to estimate the model, and their fit to our data. The first alternative consists of implementing the analysis in
this subsection using also the decisions of the poor farmers outside the critical season. The second alternative
consists of implementing simultaneously the demand estimation and the analysis in this subsection, using the
decisions from all the farmers, wealthy and poor. These alternatives are considerably more complex than our
approach. In Appendix C.8 we discuss the complications and additional assumptions needed to implement
them.
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i = 1, . . . , I, t = 1, . . . , T.
where  t (rei; ) =  i0 +  1rei captures the weekly cash flow function derived from the
real estate,  rei, minus the weekly consumption of individual i that is constant over time,
 i0; ⌘it is the farmer’s revenue from selling the harvest that we define below; and ⌫it is an
idiosyncratic financial shock that we specify below. The farmer collects the revenue after the
harvest, in week 24. Thus, the revenue, ⌘it, is:
⌘it =
8>><>>:
0 {t : wt 6= 24}
Rit {t : wt = 24}
, (C.8)
where Rit =
52P
wt=1
h (Mt 1, wt) =
32P
wt=18
  ⇥ (Mt 1   PW )⇥KS (Mt).
Given that farmers buy more than one unit very seldom, we assume J = 1 in this
subsection, and focus only on the decision of buying vs. not buying. The probability that
farmer i is liquidity constrained in period t, denoted by P (ptjit > µit), is given by:
P (ptjit > µit) = P (ptjit > µi,t 1   pt 1ji,t 1 +  t (rei; ) + ⌘it + ⌫it)
= P (⌫it <  Cit)
= F⌫ ( Cit)
(C.9)
i = 1, . . . , I, t = 1, . . . , T,
where the first line follows from the equation in (C.7); Cit ⌘ µi,t 1  pt 1ji,t 1 + t (rei; ) +
⌘it   ptji,t; and F⌫ (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of ⌫it.
Similarly, the probability that farmer i is not liquidity constrained in period t, denoted
by P (ptjit  µit), is given by:
P (ptjit  µit) = P (⌫it    Ct)
= 1  F⌫ ( Ct)
(C.10)
i = 1, . . . , I, t = 1, . . . , T,
where the second line uses the symmetry of the distribution of ⌫it.
In the data we only observe whether a farmer buys water. When a farmer does not
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buy water, we do not know whether it is because they do not need the water and have a low
valuation or because they are liquidity constrained and have a high valuation. That is, for the
liquidity-constrained farmers, the decision variable is censored. An additional complication
is that we know that the wealthy farmers are not liquidity constrained, but we do not know
which of the poor farmers are liquidity constrained. In this subsection, we estimate a lower
bound on the probability of being liquidity constrained for each of the poor farmers during
the critical season using the procedure described below.
There are three main diﬃculties in estimating the probabilities in the equations in (C.9)
and (C.10) for the poor farmers who are potentially liquidity constrained. First, the revenue,
⌘it, from the equation in (C.7) is unobserved in the data. Recovering the revenue requires
an estimate of the production function. We estimate the parameters that characterize the
production function in Section 4 in the paper using only the purchase decisions of the wealthy
(unconstrained) farmers, and the moisture level resulting from the actual purchase decisions
of the poor (potentially constrained) farmers.
Second, the conditional choice probabilities of the poor farmers and the wealthy farmers
may diﬀer outside the critical season, but will coincide during the critical season if the poor
farmers were not liquidity constrained. Outside the critical season, the purchase behavior of a
potentially constrained farmer who is in the unconstrained state may diﬀer from the behavior
of a potentially constrained who is in the constrained state. For example, a potentially
constrained farmer may abstain from purchasing water outside of the critical season, even
when feasible, to make sure that they are not constrained during the critical season when the
marginal return on water is higher. Similarly, a potentially constrained farmer who believes
that they may be constrained during the critical season will purchase water before the critical
season and “store” it within the trees and soil by increasing their moisture. Part of the water
will evaporate during the critical season, but this is the best the farmer can do when they
are constrained during the critical season. The latter behavior can be seen in the paper in
Figure 2 and Table 2, which show that potentially constrained farmers buy more water before
the critical season. For these reasons, using the smooth conditional choice probabilities from
the wealthy farmers would underestimate the probability of being liquidity constrained for
a potentially constrained farmer who believes that may be constrained during the critical
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season. During the critical season, however, the purchase decision is determined by the tree’s
need for water (stages II, III, and the early post harvest as depicted in Figure 1 in the paper),
conditional on the moisture. Thus, during the critical season, the purchase behavior of a
potentially constrained farmer who is in the unconstrained state is the same as the purchase
behavior of a permanently unconstrained farmer. This is captured by their conditional choice
probabilities, as discussed below. In turn, these purchase behaviors are the same as the
purchase behavior that would be observed for a potentially constrained farmer who is in the
constrained state had the farmer not been constrained. Table A3 provides evidence about
this. During regular years (i.e. years without droughts), potentially constrained farmers who
believe that they may be constrained during the critical season, purchase more water than
unconstrained farmers before the critical season (i.e. before the uncertainty about rain is
realized). However, their purchases are not statistically diﬀerent from the purchases of the
wealthy farmers during the critical season (i.e. after uncertainty about rain is realized) in
regular years (Table A3 column 2). In a dry year, however, when poor farmers are likely to be
liquidity constrained, wealthy farmers do buy more water during the critical season (Table A3
column 4). We interpret this as evidence that, during the critical season, and conditional on
moisture, the smooth conditional choice probabilities of the wealthy (unconstrained) farmers
can be used to infer the purchase behavior of the poor (potentially constrained) farmers in the
counterfactual, unobserved scenario that the latter were unconstrained. For these reasons, in
the procedure below we estimate the probability of being liquidity constrained for the poor
farmers only during the critical season.
Finally, weekly water consumption is also unobserved. In principle, the weekly consump-
tion can be estimated using the procedure described below under the additional assumption
that, during the critical season, the weekly consumption for a potentially constrained farmer
who is in the unconstrained state is the same as the weekly consumption of a potentially
constrained farmer who is in the constrained state. This assumption may be violated if, for
example, one of the poor farmers is permanently unconstrained. For this reason, rather than
estimating the weekly consumption of the poor farmers, we set it equal to zero for all farm-
ers, and estimate an upper bound on the probability that the farmer is liquidity constrained.
That is, with positive weekly consumption, the probability of being liquidity constrained will
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be higher than the one we estimate, but it will still be contained within our bounds.
To summarize, we estimate a lower bound on the probability of being liquidity constrained
during the critical season for potentially liquidity constrained farmers as follows. First,
we generate the actual revenue of the farmer using the estimated demand system and the
moisture level resulting from the actual purchase decision of the poor farmers. Second, we
focus on the decisions under the critical season and exploit the fact that, during the critical
season, purchase decisions are determined by the production function of apricots. Finally, we
set the consumption of the poor farmers equal to zero and obtain an upper bound on these
probabilities.
We now describe a simple procedure to estimate a lower bound on the probability of being
liquidity constrained for the poor farmers during the critical season. To simplify notation, in
what follows we omit conditioning on the state variables. Everything is, however, conditional
on the state. Let the estimated smooth conditional choice probability (CCP) of not buying
water, i.e., jit = 0, for a wealthy farmer be PˆCCP (jit = 0). Similarly, let the estimated smooth
CCP of buying water, i.e., jit = 1, for a wealthy farmer be PˆCCP (jit = 1). For potentially
liquidity constrained farmers, define the following variable:
j˜it =
8>><>>:
jit if ptjit < µit
0 if ptjit   µit
.
Then, during the critical season:
P(j˜itc = 0) = P[(jitc = 0 ^ ptcjitc < µitc) _ (ptcjitc   µitc)],
= P(jitc = 0)P(ptcjitc < µitc) + P(ptcjitc   µitc),
i = 1, . . . , I, tc = {t : 18  wt  32},
where the second equality follows because during the critical season, purchase decisions are
determined by the production function of apricots, thus making jit independent of µit due to
the former being determined by the observable states and the i.i.d. productivity shocks.
Thus:
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Pˆ
 
j˜itc = 0; 
 
= PˆCCP (jitc = 0) [1  F⌫ ( Ctc ; )] + F⌫ ( Ctc ; ) , (C.11)
i = 1, . . . , I, tc = {t : 18  wt  32}.
where   ⌘ ( i0, 1,  2⌫) is a parameter vector.
Using the same argument as above:
P(j˜itc = 1) = P[(jitc = 1 ^ ptcjitc < µitc)],
= P(jitc = 1)P(ptjitc < µitc),
i = 1, . . . , I, tc = {t : 18  wt  32}.
Thus:
Pˆ
 
j˜itC = 1; 
 
= PˆCCP (jitC = 1) [1  F⌫ ( CtC ; )] . (C.12)
Note that P
 
j˜itC = 0
 
+ P
 
j˜itC = 1
 
= 1.
We estimate the parameter vector by maximizing the log-likelihood function:
  = arg max
 
XI
i=1
X
t˜c
1
 
j˜it˜c = 0
 
logPˆ
 
j˜it˜c = 0; 
 
+ 1
 
j˜it˜c = 1
 
logPˆ
 
j˜it˜c = 1; 
 
,
i = 1, . . . , 12, t˜c = {t : 18  wt  32},
where Pˆ
 
j˜itC = 0; 
 
and Pˆ
 
j˜itC = 1; 
 
are given by the equations in (C.11) and (C.12),
respectively; and i index poor farmers.
As discussed above, for the estimation we set the weekly consumption to zero,  i0 = 0,
and obtain a lower bound on poor farmers’ probability of being liquidity constrained during
the critical season. We also set the cash flow derived from farmers’ real state to zero,  1 = 0,
because there is no variation in this variable in the data with 10 out of the 12 poor farmers
having no urban real estate (i.e. rei = 0 for i = 1, . . . , 10 among the poor farmers). We let
⌫it ⇠ N (0,  2⌫). Thus,   =  2⌫ . Finally, we use the estimated distribution of cash holdings
to generate the initial distribution as follows: (i) start the cash holdings at an arbitrary
initial level of zero in 1955; (ii) use the first three years in the sample (years 1955, 1956, and
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1957) to generate an initial distribution of cash determined by the model conditional on the
parameter vector; and (iii) use the remaining years in the data (years 1958 to 1966) and the
generated initial condition in (ii) to perform the estimation.12
Estimation Results
The estimated parameter from this subsection is  ˆ2⌫ = 184.32 with a standard error of 58.29
for the poor farmers.13 The distribution of yearly estimated lower bounds of poor farmers’
probability of being liquidity constrained during the critical season, defined as the mean
across t˜c by farmer, where t˜c = {t : 18  wt  32}, are given in Figure A8. They correspond
to Pˆ
 
j˜itC = 0;  ˆ
 
and Pˆ
 
j˜itC = 1;  ˆ
 
, given by the equations in C.11 and C.12, with  ˆ =
(0, 0,  ˆ2⌫). In all years the estimated probabilities range from a minimum of zero to a maximum
of one, indicating substantial heterogeneities in the probabilities of being liquidity constraints
during the critical season for the poor farmers.14 Some of the poor farmers are liquidity
constrained with probability one, while others are not liquidity constrained. As expected,
the mean probability increases during the dry years of 1960 and 1964.
C.7 Welfare Measures.
In this subsection we describe how we construct the welfare measures. Given rainfall and the
allocation of water among farmers, the yearly average revenue per tree for farmer i is given
by:
Revenuei =
1
# treesi
1
T
TX
t=1
"
52X
wt=1
h (Mi,t 1, wt)  ⇣j
#
. (C.13)
Note that we do not take into account water expenses because we are interested in welfare
measures (i.e. transfers are not taken into account). We define welfare as follows:
12This is the standard approach in the industrial organization literature to deal with the unobserved initial
condition of the inventory (see e.g. Hendel and Nevo, 2006, p. 1647, where our unobserved initial cash holding
is analogous to Hendel and Nevo’s unobserved initial inventory). We have experimented with diﬀerent initial
conditions and obtained similar results.
13The standard error is computed by bootstrapping from the asymptotic distribution of the parameters in
Section 4 in the paper.
14Note that the figure is informative about these heterogeneities, because its displays the distribution of
estimates across poor farmers.
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Figure A8: Lower Bound on the Probability of Being Liquidity Constrained
Notes: The figure displays the estimated lower bounds of the probability of being liquidity constrained (PLC)
during the critical season for the poor farmers using the procedure described in Subsection C.6. Each vertical
line displays the distribution of the mean PLC across farmers, defined as the the mean across t˜c by farmer
with t˜c = {t : 18  wt  32}. Each vertical line displays the maximum PLC (upper whisker), mean (solid
line), and minimum PLC (lower whisker). The figure shows the distribution across poor farmers.
Welfarei =
1
# treesi
1
T
TX
t=1
"
52X
wt=1
h (Mi,t 1, wt)  ⇣j + ✏ijt
#
. (C.14)
Auctions using Complete Units (Ac).
We compute both revenue and welfare.
• Poor farmers. We compute revenue using the estimated demand system, ⇥ˆ ⌘⇣
 ˆ,  ˆ", ⇣ˆ
⌘
. and actual purchases made by poor farmers. We use equations C.13 (rev-
enue) and C.14 (welfare), and the moisture level in the farmers’ plots (i.e. the moisture
resulting from their actual purchase decisions).
• Wealthy farmers. We compute the revenue using the estimated demand system,
⇥ˆ ⌘
⇣
 ˆ,  ˆ", ⇣ˆ
⌘
, and the actual purchases made by wealthy farmers. We use equations
C.13 (revenue) and C.14 (welfare), and moisture level in the farmers’ plots (i.e. the
moisture resulting from their actual purchase decisions). Note that the revenue for
wealthy farmers can be greater than the HV c average revenue. This is because poor
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farmers are sometimes liquidity constrained, so wealthy farmers buy more water than
the amount required by the HV c allocation.
Quotas (Q).
Revenue and welfare coincide under the quota system because farmers do not choose when to
irrigate. We only report one measure that we call “welfare.” As explained in Section 2 in the
paper, in this paper we focus on the 24 farmers who only grow apricot trees. These farmers
bought 633 units of water under the auction system over the sample period. Under the quota
system, we allocate the same number of units of water (633 units) in each week when these
units were bought under the auction. In the empirical application the quota implemented
was closest to Qc25%. We also compute the welfare under other quota configurations, where
we allocate units among the farmers as follows:
• Quotas with random assignment of complete units, Qc. Every time we observe
that a farmer bought a unit of water during the auction on a particular date, the
complete unit of water is assigned uniformly at random, proportional to their amount
of land, among all farmers.
• Quotas with non-random assignment of complete units, QcX%. Every time
we observe that a farmer bought a unit of water during the auction on a particular
date, the complete unit of water is assigned uniformly at random, proportional to their
amount of land, among the X percent of farmers who had not received irrigation for
the longest amount of time, on the same date. That is, we keep track of when the
last time was that each farmer irrigated under the quota system. Then, to allocate a
unit of water on week t, we only consider the subset of farmers whose last irrigation
period was furthest away from t. This is the subset of farmers who value water most.
Then we allocate the unit of water uniformly at random, proportional to farmers’
amount of land, among this subset of farmers. The value of X defines how large this
set is. For example, if X = 100%, then all farmers are included in the set and the
unit of water is allocated uniformly at random, proportional to their amount of land,
among all farmers. Formally, the subset is defined as follows. Let tLasti < t be the
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last week farmer i was allocated a unit of water under the quota system. Let I be
the total number of farmers and let I be the set of all farmers. Let us index the
farmers according to the last time that each farmer irrigated, being farmer I the one
who irrigated in the week closest to t and being farmer 1 the farmer who irrigated in
the week farthest away from t. Then tLast1  tLast2  tLast3  · · ·  tLastI . (Note that such
ranking can always be done and, typically, can be done using several strict inequalities,
depending on how many units have been allocated in the past.) Let X = x/I ⇥ 100
for x 2 1, 2, . . . , I. So given X, we can compute x = X/100 ⇥ I. Then, under QcX%
we allocate the unit of water uniformly at random, proportional to farmers’ amount of
land, among the subset of farmers I˜X% ⌘ {i 2 I : i  x, with x = X/100 ⇥ I}. For
example, if I = 10, tLast1  tLast2  tLast3 < tLast4  · · ·  tLast10 , and X = 30%, then
x = 30/100 ⇥ 10 = 3 and I˜30% = {1, 2, 3}. So, we allocate the unit of water uniformly
at random, proportional to their amount of land, among farmers indexed as 1, 2, and
3. These are the three farmers whose last irrigation was farthest away from t. In
case of ties, we include all tied farmers in the subset I˜. In the previous example, if if
tLast1  tLast2  tLast3 = tLast4 = tLast5 < tLast6  · · ·  tLast10 , then I˜30% = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
For example, in Qc50%, complete units of water are allocated among the 50 percent
of farmers who did not receive irrigation the longest; in Qc25%, complete units of
water are allocated among the 25 percent of farmers who did not receive irrigation the
longest; and so on. As indicated before, under QcX% we need to keep track of when
the last time was that each farmer irrigated under the quota system. We do not have
this information for the initial weeks in the sample. So, under QcX%, we allocate
units uniformly at random, proportional to farmers’ amount of land, at the beginning
of the sample as described in the procedure above. In Qc and QX% units are allocated
uniformly at random, proportional to their amount of land, among the corresponding
set of farmers. We simulate the allocation S = 1, 000 times under Qc and QX%. In
Table 4 in the paper we report the mean welfare measures across simulations.
A-45
Highest Valuation using Complete Units (HV c).
We compute the highest-valuation allocation using complete units, denoted by HV c, as
follows. Every time we observe that a farmer bought a unit of water during the auctions on
a particular date, the complete unit of water is assigned to the farmer who values water the
most on that date.
C.8 Alternative Estimation Methods and Fit to the Data.
Next we discuss two alternatives to estimate the model, and their fit to the data in our setting.
(a) The first alternative consists of estimating probability of being liquidity constrained from
Subsection C.6, using also the decisions of the poor farmers outside the critical season, by
replacing the smooth conditional choice probabilities with the choice probabilities from the
structural model. (b) The second alternative consists of implementing simultaneously the
demand estimation in Section 4 in the paper and the estimation of the probability of being
liquidity constrained in Subsection C.6, using the decisions from all the farmers, wealthy and
poor, and estimating simultaneously both the parameters that characterize demand and the
probability of being liquidity constrained for all the farmers.
Both alternatives are considerably more complex than our approach because they would
require including: (i) two additional state variables relative to the demand estimation as we
implemented it in the paper, the cash holdings, µit, and the financial shock, ⌫it; and (ii) an
unobserved state variable, the cash holdings. The first point increases the dimension of the
state space to five, plus the random shocks, ✏it and ⌫it, thus increasing the computational
complexity and, most importantly, the data requirements for identification and to obtain
precise estimates, as discussed below. The second point precludes estimating the conditional
choice probabilities as we did in the first step of the demand estimation in the paper, thus
making no longer possible the “simple” application of the procedure from Hotz and Miller
(1993) and Hotz et al. (1994).
In principle, one could implement the alternatives in the previous paragraphs using one
of the following two approaches. First, a full solution or nested fixed point procedure to
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solve the dynamic programming problem of the farmers.15 In the case of alternative (a), one
would solve the dynamic programming problem of the poor farmers with two additional state
variables relative to the demand estimation as implemented in the paper. In the case of al-
ternative (b), one would solve the dynamic programming problem of all the farmers. Second,
an iterative procedure like, e.g., Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) could be used to calculate
the conditional choice probabilities with the unobserved state variable µit, using the expec-
tation–maximization (EM) algorithm. The EM algorithm approach does not require solving
the dynamic programming problem of the farmers, but it requires solving the maximization
step multiple times, which can be computationally intensive if the unobserved state does not
follow a Markov process, or if one needs to discretize a continuous state in small bins, as it
is in our case for the cash holdings, µit, as discussed next.16
The data requirements to obtain precise estimates when implementing the two approaches
described in the first paragraph are substantially higher than in using our approach. Alter-
natively, one would need to make additional assumptions that are diﬃcult to justify in the
empirical context of Mula, such as, using larger discrete bins for the continuous state variable
moisture or the unobserved state variable cash holdings, collapsing purchase decisions of the
farmers into a dummy variable for buying instead of modeling the decision of how many
units to buy, assuming a Markov process for the unobserved state cash holdings or for the
prices, etc. Consider, for example, the discretization of the state variables moisture and cash
holdings. With five discrete variables, and assuming we discretize the continuous variable
moisture into just 11 values, the cash holdings into just 2 values (e.g. high and low cash),
and the additional assumption that the cash holdings follow a first order Markov process,
the number of discrete cells that would arise is 11⇥52⇥3⇥2⇥2 = 6, 864. Thus, the aver-
age number of observations in each cell, the eﬀective sample size for the conditional choice
15See, e.g., Miller (1984), Pakes (1986), Rust (1987), and Wolpin (1984), and Keane and Wolpin (1994,
1997).
16A third approach would consist of using a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, MPEC,
(e.g. Luo et al. 1996; Su and Judd 2012; Dubé et al. 2012). The MPEC approach would only require
solving for the equilibrium at the final estimate of the structural parameters, avoiding repeatedly solving for
an equilibrium at each candidate of the parameter vector, thus reducing the computational burden (see, e.g.,
Su and Judd 2012 for an application of the MPEC approach to estimate the single agent dynamic discrete
choice model by Rust 1987). The main diﬃculty to apply the MPEC approach to our case is the presence of
the latent states. We are not aware of any paper that uses an MPEC approach to estimate dynamic discrete
choice models in the presence of latent states. See, e.g., Connault (2016) for a discussion about dynamic
discrete choice models with unobserved dynamics.
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probabilities, would be T/6,864 = 6,864/6,864 = 1 , where T = 6, 864 is our sample size.17 But
discretizing moisture into 11 values and the cash holdings into two values would be too low
because it will not capture the variability in the purchase decisions of the farmers. Impor-
tantly, the revenue of the farmers, ⌘it, that enters into the unobserved state cash holdings
in the equation in C.7, depends on the seasonal eﬀect, thus violating the simple Markov
assumption. Although in principle one could discretize the continuous variable moisture in
smaller bins, and keep track of the cash holdings throughout the year, the computational
and identification burden would increase as discussed below. Similarly, collapsing purchase
decisions of the farmers into a dummy variable for buying would eliminate, by construction,
any variation in the number of units bought when farmers do buy. Such variation is impor-
tant in the data because poor farmers are more likely than wealthy farmers to buy multiple
units before the critical season to “store” such water in their moisture in case they cannot
buy water during the critical season due to being liquidity constrained (e.g. see Figure 2 in
the paper). Not accounting for such variation would artificially generate lower revenue for
the poor farmers relative to the wealthy farmers, because the moisture of poor farmers would
be artificially lower before the critical season.
There are also computational and identification limitations in implementing the alterna-
tive approaches presented above. The full solution approach requires solving the dynamic
programming problem of each farmer at each candidate value of the parameter vector. The
computational requirements of the full solution approach increase substantially when there
is an unobservable, time varying state variable like cash holdings in our setting. Keane and
Wolpin (2010) is one of the few papers we are aware of that performs a full solution approach
with unobservable, time-varying state variables. The EM algorithm approach requires repeat-
ing the maximization step multiple times. Integrating over the unobserved state complicates
forming the likelihood of the data required to compute the conditional choice probabilities
of being in particular values of the unobserved state. The computational requirements can
be mitigated, to a certain extent, using some of the assumptions discussed in the previous
paragraph. However, these assumptions are problematic in our case due to their fit to the
empirical setting, as discussed above. Finally, identification of the unobserved state variables
17Note that: T = 6, 864 = 12 unconstrained farmers ⇥ 52 weeks per year ⇥ 11 years.
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in both approaches is limited by the length of the panel and the variation in the observable
state variables (see, e.g., Arcidiacono and Miller 2011).18
The specificities of our setting allow us to separate the estimation into two parts, which
in turn enables us to exploit variation in our data as described below. For the demand
estimation, wealthy farmers are never liquidity constrained, as discussed in the paper. So
we do not use the model to estimate their probability of being liquidity constrained. We
determine their unconstrained status directly from the data by looking at the value of their
urban real estate. Thus, we estimate the parameters that characterize demand without
incorporating the unobserved cash holdings. This simplifies the dimension of the state space
to four observed state variables, plus the random shocks, ✏it, that we integrate analytically
as described in Subsection C.3. This approach also allows us to use smaller (relative to
the alternative approaches presented above) discrete bins for the continuous state variable
moisture, and to use the variability in the moisture level resulting from the number of units
bought by the farmers rather than a dummy variable for whether to buy. Because we do not
have the unobserved cash holdings as a state variable, we apply the procedure from Hotz
and Miller (1993) and Hotz et al. (1994). In our case in particular, the forward simulation
procedure from Hotz et al. (1994) has two advantages. First, it allows us to incorporate
the continuous variable moisture in a straight manner by using Monte Carlo simulations
to approximate continuation values at states not observed in the data. Second, it requires
only estimating future choice and transitions probabilities associated with the nodes of some
simulated future path of the farmer. Thus, by exploiting the representation by Hotz and
Miller (1993), we avoid the full solution that would require solving the dynamic programming
problem of each farmer at each candidate value of the parameter vector. By using the forward
simulation procedure from Hotz et al. (1994), we avoid integration of the value functions
over all future paths. By determining the unconstrained status directly from the data, we
avoid the EM algorithm that would require solving the maximization step multiple times.
For the estimation of the probability of being liquidity constrained, we exploit that in our
setting the purchase decision during the critical season is determined by the technological
18For further details about advances in the estimation of dynamic discrete choice models see Arcidiacono
and Ellickson (2011).
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constrained imposed by the production function of apricots. Thus, we use the conditional
choice probabilities of the wealthy farmers during the critical season to obtain a lower bound
on the probability that the poor farmers are liquidity constrained. The lower bound results
from setting the unobserved consumption to zero in Subsection C.6.19 The assumptions
required to implement the estimation of the demand and the probability of being liquidity
constrained are, respectively, that wealthy farmers are never liquidity constrained, and that
poor and wealthy farmer have the same production function for apricots. We provide evidence
to support these assumptions, and discuss their validity in our empirical context in Section
7 in the paper and in Section D in this appendix.
C.9 Dynamic Demand System.
In this paper we do not model the auction game and, thus, we abstract from the within-week
variation in prices. We translate the auction mechanism into a simpler dynamic demand
system, whereby individual farmers take prices as exogenous. To that end, we compute
the average price per week and assume that farmers can purchase water at this price. This
allows us to focus on the dynamic behavior of farmers across weeks in the presence of liquidity
constraints, which is the main focus of the paper. In theory, one could nest the full dynamic
auction game within the dynamic framework currently used, and estimate the game like in
Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003). In practice, for the case of Mula, however, it is unfeasible
to perform such estimation because of the small variation in average prices per farmer within
weeks. Nonetheless, we provide the full dynamic auction model, in Subsection C.10 in this
appendix. See Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2018) for details about the dynamics and strategic
behavior within four-unit auctions.
In our simulations, the market clears by setting the total number of available units in a
given week equal to the total demand from the farmers who buy water in that week. Each
week there are 40 units to be assigned among all farmers. Apricot farmers decide whether to
buy at the weekly price. In addition, the total number of units that apricot farmers can buy
throughout the sample is fixed to 633 units, the actual number of units the apricot farmers
19Note that the estimation of the probability of being liquidity constrained in Subsection C.6 is not needed
to perform the welfare analysis from Section 6 in the paper.
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bought during the sample under the auction.
C.10 Dynamic Auction Model with Within-Week Price Variation.
In this section, we consider the dynamic bidding case in which the farmer can buy several
units of water each week. The purchase is sequential. The farmer is oﬀered a price for the
first unit and decides whether to purchase the unit or not. After this decision, the farmer is
oﬀered a price for the second unit, and so forth. The prices oﬀered to the farmer follow a
stochastic Markov process. The farmer knows the parameters governing this process.
There are 40 units auctioned every week. Before the first price is oﬀered, the farmer
observes the rain in the previous week and a 10⇥1 vector containing the shocks to the utility
for the next week: 5 days, Monday to Friday; 2 schedules, day and night; ✏it = (✏it1, ..., ✏it10).
Each value of the shock represents a shock to the utility for all four units in a four-unit
auction. We abstract here from the equilibrium played within each four-unit auction, see
Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2018) for details.
We index each of the ten units by k. Let us denote a purchase of j units of water by
farmer i, during period t and within the kth four-unit auction by jitk, with 0  jitk  4,
and
Pk=10
k=1 jitk = jit  40. Also denote by ptk the price associated with buying any unit
within the kth four-unit auction in period t, and by V (Mit, xit, ✏it) the value of a farmer to
participate in a 40-unit auction at week t, where ✏it ⌘ (✏it1, ..., ✏it10) is an unobserved state
and xt ⌘ (wt, pt, rt, µit) is an observed state. . Let 'itk be a state variable in the within-
period game. The variable 'itk includes the units of water already purchased by the farmer
in period t up to auction k   1, thus 'it1 = 0 and 'itk =
Pl=k 1
l=1 jitl. Hence, for the within
week auction game we have:
V (Mit, xit, ✏it) = h (Mit, wt;  ) 
k=10X
k=1
(j⇤itkptk + ⇣jk + ✏ijtk) +  V (Mit+1, xit+1, ✏it+1) ,
where j⇤itk are the elements of the solution to the game below. We define the value of the
farmer of entering the within-week game as:
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V (Mit, xit, ✏it) ⌘ W1 (Mit, xit, ✏it; 0) .
Then the (finite) within-week game is:
W1 (Mit, xit, ✏it; 0) = Max
jit12{0,...,4}
{h (Mit, wt;  )  (jit1pt1 + ⇣j1 + ✏ijt1) +W2 (Mit, xit, ✏it;'it2)} ,
...
Wk (Mit, xit, ✏it;'itk) = Max
jitk2{0,...,4}
{  (jitkptk + ⇣jk + ✏ijtk) +Wk+1 (Mit, xit, ✏it;'itk+1)} ,
...
W10 (Mit, xit, ✏it;'it10) = Max
ji,t,102{0,...,4}
{  (jit,10pt,10 + ⇣j,10 + ✏ijt,10) +W11 (Mit, xit, ✏it;'it11)} .
Note that:
 V (Mit+1, xit+1, ✏it+1) ⌘ W11 (Mit, xit, ✏it;'it11) .
If we do not assume that all prices are learned at the beginning of the week, but rather,
that prices are learned at the beginning of each four-unit auction, then we have:
W1 (Mit, xit, ✏it; 0) = Max
jit12{0,...,4}
{h (Mit, wt;  )  (jit1pt1 + ⇣j1 + ✏ijt1) + E [W2 (Mit, xit, ✏it;'it2)]} ,
...
Wk (Mit, xit, ✏it;'itk) = Max
jitk2{0,...,4}
{  (jitkptk + ⇣jk + ✏ijtk) + E [Wk+1 (Mit, xit, ✏it;'itk+1)]} ,
...
W10 (Mit, xit, ✏it;'it10) = Max
ji,t,102{0,...,4}
{  (jit,10pt,10 + ⇣j,10 + ✏ijt,10) +W11 (Mit, xit, ✏it;'it11)} ,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the remaining prices to be disclosed in the
current week, and the price sequence follows a Markov chain.
We do not include a discount factor within week because the time from one auction to the
following is just a few minutes and the discount factor in this case is virtually 1 (i.e. we only
include a weekly discount factor,  ). Instead, we can solve this game by backward induction
if we know the value of Vi,t+1 (·). The solution concept is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in
the first case, and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if price are learned at every step.
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D Extended Discussion about the Fit of the Model to the
Data
In this section we thoroughly discuss the fit of our model to the empirical setting in Mula.
To facilitate the reading, we repeat the discussion in Section 7 in the paper.
D.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity.
The diﬀerences in production as a measure of welfare in Table 4 are due to diﬀerences in
soil moisture levels (i.e. some farmers irrigate more than others) because our specification
assumes that all farmers are equally productive, up to an idiosyncratic productivity shock.
An alternative explanation would be that diﬀerences in production are due to unobserved
diﬀerences in productivity. For example, it could be that wealthy farmers used additional
productive inputs (e.g. fertilizers, hired labor, manure, etc.) in greater quantities than
did poor farmers. Thus, poor farmers’ production would be lower than wealthy farmers’
production due to both diﬀerences in soil moisture levels and greater use of these additional
productive inputs.
Although we cannot rule out this argument explicitly, it does not aﬀect our counterfactual
results from Table 4 in the paper. We cannot rule it out explicitly because we have no data
about the relative use of these additional productive inputs and our econometric specification
does not allow for persistent diﬀerences in productivity among farmers. However, it does not
aﬀect our counterfactual results in the historical context of Mula. Artificial fertilizers were
not introduced in Mula until the 1970s. Farmers did use manure and mules when farming
the land. If poor farmers faced liquidity constraints when buying water, it is reasonable
that they also faced LC when buying these other inputs or capital. So if wealthy farmers
used additional productive inputs in greater quantities than did poor farmers under the
auction, the transition from auctions to quotas would increase the production of poor farmers
more than we predicted in the counterfactual from Table 4 in the paper. This is because,
under quotas, farmers do not have to make large payments for water (maintenance costs are
substantially lower than the prices of water under the auction), leaving them extra cash to
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buy additional productive inputs. In other words, under quotas poor farmers are less likely to
be liquidity constrained to buy additional inputs. Even if poor farmers were less productive
than wealthy farmers during the auctions period due to underuse of inputs/capital, they
would be as productive as wealthy farmers under the quotas.20 Next we further explore this
issue by generalizing the model and allowing correlation between the wealth and productivity
of the farmers.21
D.2 Correlation Between Wealth and Productivity.
Throughout the paper we assume that there are no persistent diﬀerences in productivity
between wealthy and poor farmers. Although this hypothesis is untestable, we believe it
is reasonable in the historical context of Mula. All farmers’ plots are located in a small,
relatively flat area spanning less than 2 km; thus, weather conditions are the same. To the
best of our knowledge, there are no historical sources mentioning (explicitly or implicitly)
diﬀerences in productivity among farmers, or between wealthy and poor farmers. Table A8,
Panel A, shows that although wealthy farmers have larger plots (column 1), when considering
all agricultural products there are no diﬀerences in revenue per tree (column 5) between poor
and wealthy farmers in 1954 (the only year where revenues are observed). Interviews with
surviving farmers confirm this. The diﬀerences between poor and wealthy farmers (columns
2, 3, and 4) are attributable to the larger plots of wealthy farmers. Note that the year
responsible for 1954 revenue was particularly dry (water prices were substantially higher
than other years in the sample). So we would expect large diﬀerences in revenue per tree
if diﬀerences in productivity were large. However, Table A8, Panel B, shows that there are
only large diﬀerences in revenue per tree for farmers who grow only apricot trees. These
diﬀerences are accounted for by moisture diﬀerences (lower water purchases) of poor farmers
relative to wealthy farmers during the critical season in 1954.
20In terms of the model, this can be interpreted as a weaker assumption required for the welfare results to
hold. The welfare analysis only requires that poor farmers are as productive as wealthy farmers under quotas
(not under auctions), which is a credible assumption in the historical context of Mula as explained above.
21Although our model does not allow for persistent unobserved heterogeneity, we do estimate the parameter
 2✏ , which determines the variance of the idiosyncratic shock,  
2
✏⇡
2/6. The higher the value of  2✏ , the more
heterogeneous the distribution of productivity. If  2✏ is large enough, auctions are more eﬃcient than quotas
because, under quotas, there is no decision nor gains from trade. See Section 6 in the paper.
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Moreover, Table A8, Panel B, shows that solely among farmers who grow only apricot
trees, do wealthy farmers obtain greater revenue than poor farmers. However, if a farmer
grows another agricultural product in addition to apricot trees (e.g. oranges), then there are
no substantial diﬀerences between wealthy and poor farmers. Moreover, revenue for oranges
is not correlated with the wealth of the farmer either. This is because oranges are harvested
in winter, unlike apricots, which are harvested in the summer when the prices of water in
the auction are high. Prices of water during the orange harvest season are low; thus LC
plays no role. Farmers who grow both apricots and oranges use the cash obtained in winter
from the orange harvest to buy water for apricots in the summer. Similarly, farmers use
cash obtained from the apricot harvest to buy water for oranges in winter. Hence, these
multi-crop farmers are not aﬀected by LC. Farmers who grow only apricots do not have
access to this “cash smoothing mechanism” and are therefore aﬀected by LC. Results for
other agricultural products harvested in the summer such as lemons and peaches are similar
to those for apricots. The results in Table A8, Panel B, provide evidence of both LC and
low-productivity heterogeneity. Column (1) shows that the average revenue per apricot tree
for farmers growing only apricots is substantially lower for poor farmers. Column (2) shows
that the revenue per orange tree is similar for poor and wealthy farmers. Column (3) shows
that the same is true among the farmers who grow apricots and other crops, as well as for
lemons and peaches. We interpret these results as evidence that the diﬀerences in revenue
observed among the farmers who grow only apricots are due to diﬀerences in input utilization
(e.g. water) used by wealthy and poor farmers, and not due to diﬀerences in their production
function.22
The evidence presented above suggests that the correlation between wealth and produc-
tivity is small. (The actual correlation coeﬃcient between urban real estate and revenue per
tree in 1954 is -0.06.) Nonetheless we performed a sensitivity analysis to examine how large
the correlation should be to revert the welfare results from Table 4.23 We explore this by
22When looking at the revenue per tree for wealthy farmers, farmers growing only apricot trees have a
greater revenue than farmers growing also other crops. The reason behind this result is that wealthy farmers
growing only apricot trees have a lower average number of trees (72 trees) than farmers growing also other
crops (109 trees). This is due to disseconomies of scale. The number of trees for poor farmers growing only
apricot trees is 73, thus disseconomies of scale play no role when comparing poor and wealthy farmers.
23We thank a co-editor, Fabrizio Zilibotti, for this suggestion.
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Table A8: Farmers characteristics and wealth.
Panel A: Size and Composition of Plots and Wealth, for all agricultural
products.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Area Total
(Ha)
Area with
trees (Ha)
Fraction
with trees
Revenue
(pesetas)
Revenue/ area
(pesetas/m2)
Urban real estate 34,023*** 22,069*** -0.0355 23,894*** -0.1797
(9,747) (7,031) (0.0320) (4,024) (0.7543)
Number of observations 388 388 388 388 388
Notes: All regressions are OLS specifications. The dependent variable is the variable in each column. “Urban
real estate” measures the value of a farmer’s urban real estate in pesetas. Standard errors in parentheses. *
p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Panel B: Revenue per tree in 1954 for each agricultural products.
Apricot Orange Apricot Lemon Peach
(only) (other) (other) (other) (other)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Rev. per tree 134.21 125.13 124.70 112.92 51.81
# trees 73.0 152.0 90.0 102.4 93.1
Poor Rev. per tree 105.47 131.65 129.69 120.37 47.09
# trees 73.6 137.8 71.8 97.0 81.6
Wealthy Rev. per tree 162.94 119.48 119.23 105.93 55.58
# trees 73.4 164.6 109.0 107.4 102.3
# farmers 24 322 239 64 45
Notes: Own elaboration from the 1954 Agricultural census. “CROP (only)” refers to the revenue generated
by CROP trees for farmers that only grow CROP trees. “CROP (other)” refers to the revenue generated by
CROP trees for farmers who grow CROP and other trees. (CROP represents Apricot, Orange, Lemon, and
Peach.) “Wealthy” (“Poor”) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the value of urban real estate of the farmer
is above (below) the median, and 0 otherwise.
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generalizing the model and allowing for correlation between wealth and land quality (or the
use of additional inputs). One way to do this is to allow the apricot production function,
h (jit,Mt, wt;  ), to shift with wealth. Let  i be a factor multiplying the apricot production
function of farmer i and be given by:
 i ⌘ 1 + ⇢w,pNWi + (1  ⇢w,p)#i 8t, (D.1)
where ⇢w,p 2 [0, 1] is the correlation between wealth and productivity, NWi is the normalized
wealth of farmer i such that E (NWi) = 0 and V (NWi) = 1, and #i is an i.i.d. random
shock to farmer i such that E (#i) = 0 and V (#i) = 1. Note that E ( i) = 1. Also note that
if ⇢w,p = 0, there is no correlation between wealth and productivity but it has permanent
heterogeneity unlike the original model. When the variance of the random shock goes to
zero, we are back in our original model.
Data about land quality or the use of additional inputs is not available, so it is impossible
to pin down the correlation parameter, ⇢w,p, from the data. To perform the sensitivity
analysis we simulate the model for diﬀerent values of ⇢w,p using equation (D.1) as follows. In
each simulation s 2 S = 1, 000, each farmer i 2 {1, . . . , 24} has always the same normalized
wealth, NWi, obtained from the data. To avoid arbitrarities choosing the distribution of the
white noise, we let #i to be a random draw from the normalized empirical wealth distribution
(i.e. a random draw from NWi.).24 Thus, in each simulation s, each farmer i has a diﬀerent
random draw, #i (this introduces noise to the simulation that vanishes progressively as ⇢w,p !
1). For each simulation s we obtain  si for farmer farmer i. Then we use the same procedure
as described in baseline model in the paper. The results displayed in Figure 6 in the paper
represents the average across simulations.
Figure A9 shows the sensitivity of the welfare results from Table 4 to the correlation
between wealth and productivity, ⇢w,p, for ⇢w,p 2 [0, 1]. The figure displays the welfare
diﬀerence between quotas minus auctions as function of ⇢w,p and as percentage of the welfare
under auctions with ⇢w,p = 0 (the baseline in Table 4). The top panel displays the welfare of
quotas Qc25% minus the welfare of auctions Ac. In our base line case in Table 4 ⇢w,p = 0 and
24Results are almost identical with other distributions, such as a standard normal.
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the quotas Qc25% produce 7.6% ((1,480.47 1,375.67)/1,375.67) more output per tree than auctions
Ac. As expected, as the correlation increases, quotas are relatively less eﬃcient than auctions.
(When ⇢w,p 2 [ 1, 0] the welfare diﬀerence of quotas minus auctions is larger.) In the extreme
case where ⇢w,p = 1 (i.e. wealthy farmers are always more productive than poor farmers with
the same soil moisture level), the welfare diﬀerence between quotas Qc25% and auctions Ac
is minimal because under auctions wealthy farmers buy more water during the critical season
than do poor farmers (Figure 2 in the paper).
The top panel in Figure A9 shows that quotas Qc25% are more eﬃcient than auctions
Ac even when wealth and productivity are perfectly correlated (i.e. when ⇢w,p = 1). This
may seem counterintuitive because by moving from quotas Qc25% to auctions Ac there is a
transfer of water from wealthy (more productive) to poor (less productive) farmers according
to equation D.1. However, note that equation D.1 defines a shift in productivity (i.e. wealthy
farmers are more productive than poor farmers) for farmers with the same soil moisture
level. Under auctions Ac, wealthy farmers have substantially higher levels of moisture than
do poor farmers and, thus, wealthy farmers are less productive than poor farmers (due to the
concavity of the apricot production function, created by the cap on the amount of moisture
absorbed by the soil, even when wealthy farmers are more productive than poor farmers for
the same level of moisture). Hence, a redistribution of water from wealthy to poor farmers
under quotas Qc25% results in a net increase in eﬃciency because the increase in eﬃciency
due to the concavity of the production function is greater than the decrease in eﬃciency due
to the water being used by “less productive” poor farmers (the latter eﬀected captured by
equation D.1).
The bottom panel in Figure A9 displays the welfare of quotas Qc40% minus the welfare of
auctions Ac.25 In our base line case in Table 4 ⇢w,p = 0 and the welfare diﬀerence of auctions
Qc40% minus auctions Ac is approximately 3 percent. Now, as ⇢w,p increases, quotas Qc40%
are less productive than auctions Ac in contrast to the top panel, where quotas Qc25% are
always more eﬃcient than auctions. Note, however, that both panels in Figure A9 show that
auctions are relatively more eﬃcient than quotas as ⇢w,p increases (downward slope). This
25Notice that Figure A9 shows Qc40% instead of Qc50%. We do this because Qc50% is not statistically
diﬀerent than the auction, even when productivity is not correlated with wealth.
A-58
Figure A9: Eﬃciency gains as a function of the correlation between wealth and productivity.
Notes: See Subsection C.7 for a discussion about the computation of the welfare measures in this figure.
Confidence intervals account for uncertainty about the estimated parameters (by drawing from the asymptotic
distribution) and across simulations.
is due to the shifter in productivity from equation D.1. In each panel the mechanisms to
allocate water are fixed (Qc25% and Ac in the top panel, and Qc40% and Ac in the bottom
panel), so there is no increase in eﬃciency as ⇢w,p varies. The increase in eﬃciency due to the
concavity in the production function can be seen in Figure 4 in the paper for a given value
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of correlation between wealth and productivity, ⇢w,p = 0.26
D.3 Strategic Supply.
The president of the Heredamiento de Aguas decided whether to run the auction or not.
There is no evidence that running the auction or not was a strategic decision. If there was
enough water in the dam, the auction was held. However, the president could stop the
auction at any time, and used to do so if the price fell considerably, usually to less than 1
peseta. This uncommon situation happened only after an extraordinarily rainy season.
D.4 Strategic Size and Sunk Cost.
The results obtained when comparing revenue from quotas and auctions suggest that the
choice of the unit size in the auction (i.e. three hours of irrigation) was not innocuous. In
particular, the fact that in some years poor farmers under the quota system produced higher
revenue than wealthy farmers under the auction system suggests that the size of the units
sold at the auction might be too large. The size of the units sold at auction had not changed
since the middle ages. This could be due to institutional persistence or due to other reasons,
i.e., three hours could be the size that maximizes revenue. It could be the case that three
hours maximizes profits, but not welfare.
As shown in Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2018), there is a sunk cost to the first unit of
water allocated to a plot because the dry channel absorbs some water. Subsequent units
associated with the same channel flow through a wet channel, thus, the loss is negligible for
subsequent units. In the auction system, subsequent units are allocated to diﬀerent farmers,
depending on who has won each unit. The optimal size of the unit (i.e. the size of the unit
that maximizes welfare) would be determined by a trade-oﬀ between the sunk cost incurred
every time a farmer irrigates, due to the loss of water flowing through a dry channel, and
26In principle, one could argue that the shifter in productivity from equation D.1 could be large enough
such that the slope of the lines in Figure A9 were steeper and, hence, auctions Ac outperformed quotas
Qc25% for large values of ⇢w,p. We believe this is not the case in the historical context of Mula given the
information presented in Table A8, where the correlation coeﬃcient between wealth and revenue per tree in
1954 is ⇢w,p =  0.06. Also as emphasized above, data about land quality or the use of additional inputs is
not available, so it is impossible to pin down the contribution of the shifter in productivity, ⇢w,p, from the
data. Note that if the production function is linear, and wealth and productivity are perfectly correlated,
auctions are always more eﬃcient than any mechanism of quotas.
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the diminishing return of water. In the quota system, units are allocated to each farmer in
geographical order (i.e. every unit is allocated to a neighbor farmer down the channel with
respect to the previous farmer). Therefore, the sunk cost due to the sunk water is minimal.
D.5 Optimal Mix of Crops and Size.
Our analysis only considers the case in which farmers grow apricot trees. Since diﬀerent
agricultural products have diﬀerent irrigation needs in diﬀerent seasons, the optimal crop
mix involves diversifying among several agricultural products with diﬀerent irrigation needs.
For example, oranges are harvested in winter, and their need for water peaks in December.
Apricots are harvested in summer, and their need for water peaks in May-June. Hence, a
mix of crops with apricot and orange trees would outperform one with just apricot trees,
in terms of spending smoothing. We observe this optimal mix in the data. Many farmers
have orange trees and either apricot, peach, or lemon trees, all three of them are harvested
during summer. In this paper, we focus on the set of farmers who only grow apricot trees
because they have the same production function. This allows us to account for unobserved
heterogeneity without modeling it, as discussed in Section 7 in the paper.
If farmers with a summer-winter crop mix can smooth spending, and avoid being liquidity
constrained, then we would observe all, not just most, farmers with such a crop mix. However,
for a variety of reasons, Mula farmers did not all grow mixed crops. First, the farmers in
Mula inherited their land from their fathers who, in turn, inherited their land from their
fathers, who, in turn, inherited their land from their fathers, and so on. From the point of
view of the farmers studied in this paper, this means that there was no initial “choice” for
the type of crops. Moreover, if there are “fixed costs” per crop, the farmers would be better
oﬀ with only one crop. Second, if some farmers are liquidity constrained to buy water, they
might also be liquidity constrained to buy more land to plant the second crop (e.g., oranges).
A critique of the previous arguments is that wealthier farmers could just buy the land of the
poor farmers, and consolidate it with their own land. However, as shown in, e.g., Hoﬀman
(1996), growing fruit trees exhibits “decreasing marginal returns” in terms of the size of the
land with trees. This means that there is an optimal number of trees. This is because the
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owner of a large plot cannot work all the land by himself, but rather has to hire workers,
who he would have to supervise and/or accept a lower quality of work from. This is indeed
what we see in the data when more than 90% of the parcels in Mula were smaller than one
hectare.
D.6 Trees.
Quotas are desirable during a drought because they allocate a certain amount of water
periodically to each farmer. Quotas also function as insurance for farmers, who have less
uncertainty when carrying out risky investments, such as trees. A tree takes several years to
be fully productive, but will die if it does not get enough water in any given year. On the
other hand, vegetables grow more quickly than trees, and can be harvested within a year of
planting. Hence, a farmer with a secure supply of water is more likely to plant trees and
receive a higher expected profit from them.
D.7 Collusion.
The presence of a centuries-stable market alongside repeated interaction among farmers raises
a concern about bidding collusion in the auction. Historical sources (González Castaño and
Llamas Ruiz, 1991) and personal interviews with surviving farmers point in the opposite
direction.27
Rather than a system in which farmers colluded to pay a price lower than what would have
prevailed without collusion, there seemed to be bitterness among farmers competing for water,
and between farmers and employees of the cartel. Fights, loud arguments, and complaints
were common. In many instances the police intervened during the auction to guarantee its
normal development. See Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2018) for a detailed investigation of
bidding collusion in this setting.
27A summary of the interview is available upon request.
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D.8 Liquidity Constraints vs. Risk Aversion or Impatience.
One concern to identify LC is that some empirical implications of markets where agents face
liquidity constraints are similar to those of markets where agents are risk averse. In particular,
poor farmers buying water before the critical season (i.e. before uncertainty about rain is
realized) is consistent with both LC and risk aversion. We now use the response of poor
farmers to their purchase timing to investigate this concern.
The main diﬀerence in farmers’ behavior under LC and risk aversion occurs during the
summer, when prices are high. On the one hand, if poor farmers are liquidity constrained,
they would not be able to buy water when the price is high, even if the moisture level in
their plots is low. On the other hand, if farmers are unconstrained but risk averse, they
would have the same demand for water as wealthy farmers during the summer, conditional
on soil moisture levels. In Table 2, Panel B, column 4 in the paper we show that holding
the moisture level fixed, poor farmers buy less water than do wealthy farmers. Following the
results in this table, along with the opinions presented above, we conclude that poor farmers
were liquidity constrained.28
The same argument rules out the possibility that the results are driven by poor farmers
being more impatient (lower discount factor) than wealthy farmers. If poor farmers were
more impatient, their soil moisture level would be always lower than that of wealthy farmers:
an extra peseta spent on water has an immediate cost and a future reward. However, poor
farmers have higher moisture levels than wealthy farmers before the critical season, lower
moisture levels during the critical season, and again high moisture levels right after the
critical season (Figure 2 in the paper). This behavior rules out diﬀerences in discount factors
between wealthy and poor farmers.
28In this paper we abstract from diﬀerences in prices within the week (i.e. Monday to Friday, and Day to
Night). However, diﬀerences in prices within the week can also be used to asses the importance of liquidity
constraints. As shown in Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2018) prices are higher for night-time irrigation and
higher earlier in the week (prices on Mondays are higher than on Fridays). Although not reported here, we
find that poor farmers are more likely to buy water during nights and later in the week.
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D.9 Attrition.
While we have weekly panel data about water purchases, our data only contains only one
cross-sectional observation of the characteristics of the farmers. The cross-sectional char-
acteristics of the farmers were obtained from a detailed agricultural census carried by the
Franco regime in 1955. This agricultural census took place only once, in 1955, to estimate
the national capacity to produce agricultural products. One concern about observing cross-
sectional characteristics only once is potential attrition in the data. For example, it could be
that some of the farmers who only grew apricots in 1955 switched to growing apricots and
oranges during the following decade. The incentives to plant other trees, in particular orange
trees, would be greater for poor farmers facing liquidity constraints than for wealthy farm-
ers. If poor farmers switched, then we should expect a change in poor and wealthy farmers’
relative purchase of water during the critical season versus the rest of the year (diﬀerence in
diﬀerences).
We investigate this issue in Figure A10, which displays the diﬀerence in liters of water
bought per tree during the critical vs. non-critical season between wealthy and poor farmers
over time. If poor farmers were switching, we would expect a downward trend in Figure
A10. That is, over time, poor farmers growing only apricots will disappear. This is not
what we see in Figure A10. There are large diﬀerences between wealthy and poor farmers
from year to year. During dry years (1955, 1957, and 1964) price diﬀerences in summer are
large, so diﬀerences in water purchases are also large. During rainy years (1956, 1960, 1961,
and 1962) price diﬀerences in summer are small, so diﬀerences in water purchases are small.
Importantly, there is no trend in the diﬀerence in diﬀerences data, suggesting that attrition
is not a concern in the case of Mula. This is consistent with the notion that switching costs
are high, especially for poor farmers.
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Figure A10: Diﬀerences in liters of water bought per tree during the critical vs non-critical
season between wealthy and poor farmers (i.e. diﬀerence in diﬀerences).
Notes: For each year, we compute the amount of water per tree bought: (i) on and oﬀ season, and (ii) by
wealthy and poor farmers. The figure shows the evolution of the diﬀerence in diﬀerences for these groups:
wealthy on-season, wealthy oﬀ-season, poor on-season, and poor oﬀ-season. The unit of the vertical axis are
liters of water per tree.
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